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**. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Orders that are the subject of this Petition are Orders 
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Supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction to review this matter 
pursuant tc > Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 (Supp. 1990) and 78-2-
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III. STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
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IV. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
I STANDARD OP REVIEW 
Review of Agency Determinations of Fact* 
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from this Court unless he has been substantially prejudiced by an 
agenc \ r acti oi I "based upon a determination of fact , made or 
implied by the agency, that i s not supported b;y su&stanti al 
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evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (Supp. 1990). 
"Substantial evidence" is such "relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Grace 
Drilling Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). This is not de novo 
review nor a complete evidentiary review. Id. It is a review of 
the agency record as a whole. Id. The Court must review the 
Board's findings by examining both the supporting evidence and 
that which fairly detracts from those findings. 
2. Review of Agency Determinations of Legal Issues, 
Bennion is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate 
that he has been substantially prejudiced by an erroneous 
interpretation of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
(Supp. 1990). While the determination of applicable law is 
subject to the "correction of error" standard, in this case the 
resolution of the legal issues are benefitted by the Board's 
expertise, and hence are entitled to deference to the Board's 
resolution. Olympus Oil Inc. v. Harrison, 778 P.2d 1008 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) . 
The issues presented in this case involve questions of 
statutory interpretation in a highly specialized area of oil and 
gas law. Because the Board is statutorily chosen and retained 
for its expertise in these matters, deference should be granted 
in the first instance to the Board's interpretation of statute 
2 
concerning oil exploration and production. Gump & Ayers Real 
Estate. Inc. v. Domcoy Investors V, 733 P.2d 128 (Utah 1987). 
3* Review of Agency Application of Lav to Facts. 
Bennion is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate 
that he has been substantially prejudiced by an unreasonable or 
irrational application of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(d) (Supp. 1990), Review of the Board's application of law 
to facts and mixed questions of law and fact governed by the 
"reasonableness and rationality" standard requiring that the 
Boardfs decision not exceed "the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Pearl-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 775 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1989); 
Johnson v. Department of Employment Security. 782 P.2d 965 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
B. CITATION TO THE RECORD 
This brief contains numerous references to the Record on 
Appeal, the Hearing Transcripts and Exhibits entered during the 
adjudicative proceedings. Citations to the Record on Appeal will 
be by the abbreviation "R." followed by the page of the Record on 
which the matter can be found. Citations to portions of the 
September 27, 1990 Board Hearing Transcripts will be by the 
abbreviation "Tr." followed by the particular page of the 
transcript on which that fact can be found. Exhibits received 
during the Board Hearing will be cited by the abbreviation "Ex." 
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The addendum contains the order upon which review is sought 
as well as exhibits, statutes and administrative rules. 
Citations to materials in the Addendum shall be by reference to 
the Transcript, Record on Appeal or the Exhibit, followed by the 
abbreviation "Add*" for Addendum and the page of the Addendum 
where that siuthority, fact or document may be found. 
V. DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The statutes determinative of this matter are Utah Code Ann. 
S 40-6-1 (1990), § 40-6-6 (1990) and § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990). Utah 
Admin. R. 619-105-100, 200 and 500, R. 619-108-100, 200, and 201, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56 and Utah Rules of 
Evidence 402 and 403 are also relevant. These rules and statutes 
are reprinted in the Addendum to this Brief. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OP THE CASE 
This is a petition for a writ of review of an order of the 
Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, (the "Board") granting a 
Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. By petition pursuant 
to Utah Cod€i Ann. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990) , Sam H. Bennion 
("Bennnion") sought an order from the Board requiring the 
Respondent, Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham") to account for and 
to pay Bennion all proceeds due Bennion from the Jensen-Fenzl No. 
1 Well, 1-20C5, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West and 
the Page 2-20C5 Well, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, 
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Duchesne County, State of Utah (the "Wells"). (R. at 1-6). The 
two parties attempted to negotiate a resolution prior to 
appearing before the Board. However, the negotiations were 
unsuccessful. Graham, relying on the absence of an agreement or 
Order pooling Bennion's interest, moved for Dismissal of 
Bennion's Petition or for Summary Judgment. (R. at 82-99). The 
central issue before the Board was one of first impression. That 
is, whether pooling of a nonconsenting ownerfs interest pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 is a statutory condition precedent to 
entitlement to payment and accounting pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-9. 
Subsidiary issues raised on appeal involve the authority of 
the Board to hear and grant a Motion for Summary Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and to 
exclude evidence as irrelevant or untimely. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On July 17 1990, Bennion filed a petition with the Board 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990) (R. at 1-6). 
This followed previous actions concerning the same requested 
relief in Federal Courts and before the Board. Bennion's 
previous Petition for an accounting (Cause No. 139-47) was 
dismissed by the Board at their June 28,1990 hearing for lack of 
timely prosecution. (R. at 33-36; Add. E) . 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9(5), the Board asked the 
parties to attempt to negotiate a resolution to the July 17, 1990 
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Petition. These negotiations occurred August 16, 1990. (R. at 
31, 115). The parties attempted to reach an agreement by August 
31, 1990, but were unsuccessful. Following the negotiations, 
Bennion filed a Pre-Hearing Issue Statement on September 6, 1990. 
(R. at 28-32). On September 10, 1990, Graham filed a Motion for 
Dismissal, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment. (R. at 
101-103). With this motion, Graham also filed a Memorandum and 
exhibits in support of the Motion. (R. at 82-99). 
Bennion did not file any pleadings in opposition to Graham's 
Motion for Dismissal and Summary Judgment. On September 17, 
1990, Bennion's counsel sent a letter objecting to the philosophy 
of Graham's motion and asked the Board to set forth the issues 
that the Board would hear at the September 27, 1990 Board 
Hearing. (R. at 117-119). On September 17, 1990, Graham filed a 
Pre-Hearing Issue Statement. (R. 104-115) 
On September 25, 1990, Bennion's counsel moved for a 
Continuance, claiming that Mr. Bennion would not be able to 
attend the Board Hearing. (R. at 128-130). Graham filed an 
Objection to Bennion's Motion for Continuance the same day. (R. 
at 124-127). 
At the September 27, 1991 Board Hearing, the Board granted 
Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Bennion's request 
for continuance. (Tr. at 72, 73). 
On October 15, 1990, Bennion sent a letter to the Board 
claiming the Board had improperly excluded his exhibits from the 
record, and requesting that the Board admit Bennion's exhibits 
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into the record. On October 26, 1990, Graham filed an Objection 
and Motion to Strike Bennion's post-hearing submission of 
exhibits. (R. at 146-156). The Board ordered a Hearing on 
December 6, 1990 to dispose of Graham's Objection and Motion to 
Strike. (R. at 158-159). On December 3, 1990, Bennion filed a 
response to Graham's Objection and Motion to Strike. (R. at 169-
177). On January 24, 1990, the Board issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. at 185-192; Add. A). 
The Board concluded that pooling was a prerequisite to an 
accounting and payment of proceeds. Additionally, the Board 
issued a Supplementary Order dealing with the post-hearing 
Motions and Objections in which the Board ordered that Bennion's 
exhibits be admitted to the record on appeal. (R. at 193-197; 
Add. B). 
VII. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On July 17, 1990, Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 
1990), Bennion filed a Petition for Agency Action with the Board. 
(R. at 1-6) . Bennion sought an Order from the Board forcing 
Graham to provide Petitioner with an accounting of proceeds and 
for payment of production from the Wells. (R. at 1-6). Graham 
has been the operator of the Wells since April, 1984. (R. at 
12) . 
Bennion first brought this issue before the Federal 
District Court in Idaho. The court dismissed the case because it 
lacked personal jurisdiction. (R. at 48-56; Add. C). 
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Bennion then brought the issue before the Federal District 
Court in Utah. However, the court dismissed Bennion's case 
because it determined that an administrative remedy should be 
sought. (R. 40-47; Add. D). 
Thereafter, Bennion filed a Petition with the Board, which 
was heard on June 28, 1990 as Cause No. 139-47. The Board 
dismissed the Petition without prejudice for failure to timely 
prosecute. (R. at 34; Add. E). 
At the time of dismissal, the Board indicated to the parties 
that the requested relief could not be ordered in the absence of 
pooling. The Board advised the parties to resolve the pooling 
issue between themselves, or to initiate a forced pooling. (R. 
at 34; Add. E). 
On July 17, 1990, Bennion again petitioned the Board for an 
accounting from Graham. (R. at 1-6). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-9(5), the Board ordered that the parties meet to negotiate 
and investigate the matter on August 16, 1990 at the Division of 
Oil, Gas and Mining to exchange relevant information and attempt 
to resolve the issue. (R. at 31 and R. at 115). 
Both parties stated in their Pre-Hearing Issue Statements 
that no voluntary or involuntary pooling order is in effect 
concerning the wells. (R. 108-116, 28-32). Consequently, the 
parties each recognized as a central issue for the Board, the 
question of the necessity of a pooling, either voluntary or 
involuntary, as a prerequisite for Bennion to receive relief 
under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9. (Tr. at 28) (R. at 112 and R. at 
8 
30). Bennion is a non-consenting mineral interest owner as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) and has refused to lease or 
otherwise commit his mineral interest to the wells. (R. at 96). 
On September 10, 1989, Graham filed a Motion and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities to Dismiss Bennion's Request 
for Agency Action or in the alternative for Summary Judgment. 
(R. at 82-99). On September 17, Bennion, by letter, objected to 
Graham's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 117-119). On September 25, 
two days before the Board Hearing, Bennion filed a Motion to 
Continue, claiming that he had a scheduling conflict and was 
unclear concerning the issues to be adjudicated on September 
27th. (R. at 128-130). The Board denied Bennion's Motion for 
Continuance. ( R. at 185) (Tr. at 13). 
At the September 27, 1990 Hearing, the Board heard Graham's 
Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment in which Graham asserted 
that Bennion was not entitled to proceeds from the wells until a 
voluntary or involuntary pooling order was in effect concerning 
the wells. (R. at 185-192) (Tr. at 3, 46-47). 
Bennion's counsel proffered several exhibits to the Board as 
evidence. (Tr. at 6, 8, 11, 12, 16, 23, 26, 44-46, 64; 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-21). The Board, pursuant to Utah Admin. 
R. 619-108-200, ruled that the exhibits were irrelevant to 
Graham's Motion. Additionally, the Board ruled that the exhibits 
were not filed in a timely manner pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619-
105-100, 200 and 500. None of Petitioner's exhibits were 
admitted into evidence. However, they were accepted as proffers 
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and made part of the record in a Supplemental Order. (Tr. at 28-
29) (R. at 193-197). 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Board was within its express authority to grant Graham's 
Motion to Dismiss Bennion's Petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l(4)(6) (1990). The Board judgment was made pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides 
that where, on a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleadings 
are presented and not excluded by the forum, the Motion is to be 
treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56, Utah R. 
Civ. P. The Board is further authorized by Utah Code Ann. §40-
6-1 et seq. to make orders that will reduce waste and protect the 
correlative rights of all owners. 
The Board properly dismissed Bennion's action and awarded 
Summary Judgment to Graham. There are two methods to determine a 
fair and reasonable allocation of production and expenses from 
oil and gas wells. Bennion seeks relief under a variation of the 
doctrine of Equitable Pooling which is based on the original 
Spacing Order and results in a court deciding the share of 
proceeds for each mineral rights owner. However, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 et seq. (Supp. 1990) the preferred method 
adopted by the Utah legislature is based upon an intermediary 
step after spacing. That is, pooling of the mineral interests in 
the drilling unit. The Board following the statute, held that to 
10 
determine production there must be a voluntary or involuntary 
pooling agreement. 
The parties Pre-Hearing Statements of Issues and Facts 
stipulated to the absence of a pooling. Both parties and the 
Board relied on this fact and agreed that the absence of pooling 
was an issue to be resolved prior to an order ordering an 
accounting. 
Bennion is not prejudiced by the Board's entry of Summary 
Judgment because he may at any time seek a forced pooling of his 
interest to determine Bennion!s fair and reasonable share of 
production, costs and nonconsent penalty. 
Pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619-105-100, 200 and 500 and R. 
619-108-200 et seg., the Board has broad discretion to reject 
exhibits or evidence that are presented because the exhibits are 
irrelevant to the disputed issue, or not properly nor timely 
filed. The Board properly ruled against the admission of 
Bennion's proffered exhibits as evidence because they were not 
offered in opposition to the issue of the necessity of pooling 
then before the Board and were thus irrelevant. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. THE BOARD PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
GRAHAM 
1. The Board is Expressly Authorized by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act to Grant a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Pleadings if the Requirements of Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are Met. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act authorizes 
administrative agencies to dismiss actions under the 
11 
circumstances identified in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The relevant section of the act states: 
This chapter does not preclude an Agency, prior to the 
beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding 
officer during an adjudicative proceeding from . . . 
granting a timely motion for Summary Judgment . . . if the 
requirements of Rule 56 . . . of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent 
that the requirements of those rules are modified by this 
chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) (1990). 
Chapter 46b of the Act does not modify Rule 56 Motions for 
Summary Judgments. Neither the implementing statute of the Oil 
and Gas Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 et seq. (Supp. 1990) nor 
the Administrative Rules of the Board, Utah Admin. R. 619 et seq. 
modify this authority of the Board. 
The Pre-Hearing Issue and Fact Statements of the parties 
stipulate and agree that there has been no pooling, either 
voluntary or forced, of Bennion's interest in the wells. Both 
parties in their pleadings agree that the requirement of pooling 
prior to an accounting and order of payment under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-9 is an issue to be determined by the Board. Neither 
party presented evidence to contradict the factual assertion that 
Bennion's mineral interests were not pooled with regard to the 
two wells for which he sought accounting and payment. 
Furthermore, no authority was provided in opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the matter was ripe 
for Summary Judgment. 
2. Bennion is Not Entitled Under Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-9 
(1990) to an Accounting and Payment of Proceeds Until His 
Interests Have Been Pooled Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-6. 
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In this case, Bennion seeks relief from the Board such that 
his rights to proceeds from two wells drilled by the designated 
operator on a designated state drilling unit may be accounted for 
and paid to him without his interests having been pooled with the 
other ownerfs interests with which he wishes to share. Bennion 
sought this relief under both Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-9 and 40-6-
6(8)(k)• Bennion further requests an accounting showing costs 
incurred, together with quantity of oil or gas produced and the 
amount of proceeds realized from the sale of production. 
The rights and duties of mineral interest owners in the 
state of Utah are governed by the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act. Preliminarily, the statute provides for the establishment 
of drilling units for production of oil and gas. A mineral 
interest owner's participation in a well or wells drilled in a 
drilling unit and the correlative rights to accounting and 
payment of proceeds comes directly from voluntary pooling or 
forced pooling of his oil and gas interests in the drilling unit. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5) (Supp. 1990). Mineral interest 
owners may voluntarily pool their interests in the lands and 
leases contained within a drilling unit by entering into written 
agreements to combine or pool those interests and to jointly 
develop them in an agreed upon fashion. The rights and duties of 
the operator of the well, vis-a-vis the other mineral interest 
owners, are defined by such agreements. These agreements specify 
the terms upon which owners may receive an accounting. 
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As to those mineral interest owners who refuse to 
voluntarily commit or pool their mineral interests in the 
drilling unit, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5) (Supp. 1990), provides 
a statutory procedure for the forced pooling of nonconsenting 
interests. In such cases the rights and duties of the operator 
in relationship to the other force pooled interests are defined 
by statute. Where, as here, Bennion has refused to lease or 
otherwise voluntarily join, the Utah forced pooling statute is 
determinative of the outcome of this case. See Bennion v. Utah 
State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 
1983) (hereinafter "Bennion I"). 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(8) (Supp. 1990) provides the 
accounting provisions of the forced pooling statute to be applied 
by the Board. This statute provides in pertinent part: 
The operator of a well under a pooling order in which 
there are nonconsenting owners shall furnish the non-
consenting owners with monthly statements of all costs 
incurred, together with the quantity of oil or gas 
produced, and the amount of proceeds realized from the 
sale of this production during the preceding months. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(8) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). 
A "nonconsenting owner" is one who owns oil and gas interests in 
a drilling unit established by the Board but has refused to lease 
or otherwise join in the drilling of the well on the drilling 
unit and who refuses to assume the risk of drilling by paying his 
prorata share of the costs of drilling the well. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (Supp. 1990). 
There are statutory conditions precedent for a nonconsenting 
owner to meet prior to receiving statutory relief in the form of 
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an accounting ordered by the Board. These conditions are (1) the 
formal spacing of the acreage into drilling units and (2) the 
forced pooling of the nonconsenting interest into the established 
drilling unit. Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-6(5), -6(8) (Supp. 1990). 
Where, as here, the Board is construing the statute which it is 
administering, that constructure is entitled to considerable 
weight. Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983) 
The crux of Bennionfs petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
40-6-9 and the Board's entry of Summary Judgment revolves around 
the issue of when a party becomes "entitled" to proceeds under 
that section of the statute. The two sources for determining 
what and when Bennion is entitled to the relief provided by Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-9 are the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act and 
this Court's decision in Bennion I. 
Graham did not maintain, and the Board did not hold, that 
Bennion was not vested with the statutory royalty retroactive to 
the date of the spacing order, nor that his mineral interests 
would not represent an aliquot share of production in kind or in 
money value when his interests statutorily matured. This Court, 
in Bennion I. focused on when, in the history of the drilling 
unit, did Bennion have a right to participate in production from 
a well. Bennion I determined, "[T]he . . . right of the owner of 
a mineral interest who refuses to enter into a voluntary pooling 
agreement with the operator of a drilling unit as to the period 
prior to the effective date of an order forcing the pooling of 
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all interests in the drilling unit," Bennion I at 1137 (emphasis 
added)• This Court was not faced with the issue of whether 
forced pooling is a prerequisite to an accounting in that case 
because there already existed a forced pooling order. This Court 
in Bennion I held: 
We therefore affirm the Board's position that Bennion, 
as a non-consenting mineral interest owner, had a 
vested right to royalty prior to payout and a vested 
right to a statutory share (subject to payment of 
expenses) thereafter. 
Id. at 1142 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, Bennion is entitled to payment of proceeds only after 
he pays the statutory expenses that this Court recognized in 
Bennion I . Both this Court's holding and the forced pooling 
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6-(6) (1980) reinforce the 
conclusion that under Utah law, pooling is a prerequisite to an 
accounting under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9. There must be either a 
voluntary agreement or statutory pooling Order in effect for an 
Order of accounting of proceeds to be entered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) states: 
each nonconsentina owner shall be entitled to receive, 
subject to royalty or similar obligations, the share of 
production from the well applicable to his interest in 
the unit after the consenting owners have recovered 
from the nonconsentina owners share of production the 
following: 
(a) in respect to every such well 100% of the non-
consenting owner's share of the cost of surface 
equipment . . . plus 100% of the nonconsentina owner's 
share of the cost of operation of the well commencing 
with first production and continuing until the 
consenting owners have recovered those costs . . . and 
(b) an amount to be determined by the Board but not 
less than 150% nor to exceed 200% of that portion of 
the costs and expenses of staking the location, well-
site preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, 
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reworking, deepening or plugging back, testing, and 
completing, and the cost of the equipment in the well . 
. . . A reasonable interest charge may be included if 
the Board finds it appropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6-(6)(a)(b) (Supp. 1990). (emphasis added). 
Bennion argues that the Board can determine what payments 
are to be made and the subsequent accounting to a nonconsenting 
owner under an informal "equitable" pooling. (Tr. at 55-57). 
"Equitable" pooling is neither compulsory, nor voluntary, but 
exists in the absence of compulsory pooling provisions in 
statute. See 6 H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 906 
(1985). This treatise suggests the term "judicial" replace the 
term "equitable" because in the cases "equitable pooling is 
implemented, "the Court orders pooling that is probably not 
contemplated by the parties nor by the legislature that passed 
the conservation statute." 6 H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and 
Gas Law, § 906.1 (1985). 
Bennion's argument before the Board and this Court is that 
he is entitled to an equitable remedy based upon his 
representation that he has at all times been entitled to 
production from the drilling unit in which he owns a mineral 
interest. His argument is one of equity and divorced from the 
statute. Moreover, Bennion has never explained either to the 
Board or in his Brief to this Court, why he is entitled to an 
equitable remedy separate and apart from the remedy provided by 
statute. His concept of "entitlement" is entitlement in a broad 
equitable sense, and not entitlement as set forth specifically by 
this Court in Bennion I and in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
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In reality, Bennion's appeal is simply another avenue by 
which he seeks to avoid contributing to the costs and sharing in 
the risk of drilling wells in drilling units in which he owns a 
mineral interest. He seeks to raise his correlative right to a 
right greater than the right of all other interest owners in the 
drilling unit and by so doing seeks to undermine the statutory 
scheme which the legislature established to protect the 
correlative rights of all mineral interest owners and to insure 
that waste is eliminated through the encouragement of the 
drilling of oil and gas upon the lands of the state of Utah. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 (Supp. 1990). By invoking the statutory 
remedy before the Board provided by Utah Code Ann. § 4 0-6-9, 
Bennion must comply with the complete statutory scheme and 
subject his interest to the pooling process. 
In conclusion, pursuant to Utah statutory requirement, the 
Board cannot order, nor can Graham provide, an accounting until 
Bennionfs current ownership is established and his interest is 
force pooled so as to establish the criteria by which his quantum 
of interest in proceeds is determined. 
B. THE BOARD PROPERLY REFUSED TO ADMIT BENNION'S EVIDENCE 
PROFFERED ON BEHALF OF HIS CASE IN CHIEF. 
The Board properly exercised its discretion under its 
procedural rules in excluding Bennion's (Petitioner's) exhibits 
1-21. Pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619-105-500, "the Board may 
consider any exhibits filed after the due date, if the exhibits 
are accompanied by a separate motion for good cause." 
Additionally, pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619-108-201, the Board 
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{may} "exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly 
repetitious." 
Bennionfs exhibits were not timely filed. Pursuant to Utah 
Admin. R. 619-105-100, the Petitioner must file its request for 
Agency Action on the tenth day of the month preceding the 
hearing. Utah Admin. R. 619-105-100 further requires that at the 
time a petitioner requests agency action, the petitioner must 
"also file any motions, affidavits, briefs, or memoranda intended 
to be offered by said petitioner in support of said petitioner 
motion." Utah Admin. R. 619-105-100. The hearing in this matter 
was September 27, 1990, therefore Bennion should have filed his 
supporting documents and exhibits by August 10, 1990. If Bennion 
sought to enter the exhibits and affidavits in response to 
Graham's Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative for Summary 
Judgment, the exhibits were still not timely filed. Not only did 
Bennion fail to file a Response Memorandum, but pursuant to Utah 
Admin. R. 619-105-500 the following procedural rules apply: 
Any exhibits intended to be offered by petitioners . . 
. in support of matters set forth in their . . . 
pleadings will be filed with the Secretary of the Board 
on or before the time the response is due under R619-
105-200 . . . any exhibits filed by any party after the 
close of business two days prior to the hearing, but 
before the hearing, may be considered by the Board at 
the hearing only upon separate motion of the party 
offering the exhibit made at the hearing for good cause 
shown. Any exhibits intended to be offered by the 
parties in rebuttal of evidence presented at the 
hearing will be presented at the hearing. 
Utah Admin. R. 619-105-500 (Supp. 1991). 
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Bennion did not comply with this rule, nor did he move the Court 
for deviation from the rule or set forth any basis for relief 
from the rule. 
Finally, Petitioner's exhibits 1-21 were not presented in 
rebuttal to evidence presented for the first time at the Hearing. 
Indeed, the only evidence Graham presented at the Hearing was 
that evidence contained in its memorandum in support of its 
motion. Graham timely filed this memorandum, pursuant to Utah 
Admin. R. 619-105-200: "motions by respondent, together with all 
affidavits, briefs, or memoranda in support thereof, filed by the 
tenth day of the month . . . in which the hearing on the matter 
is scheduled . . . may be considered by the Board at its 
regularly scheduled meeting during the month." 
The Board, pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619-108-100, shall 
"regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant fcicts and to afford all the parties reasonable 
opportunity to present their positions." In this case, Mr. 
Bennion had full opportunity both by proffer and by the exhibits 
contained in Graham's memorandum to argue his position. 
The Board properly excluded Petitioner's exhibits not only 
because they were untimely, but also because they were 
irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious. Utah Admin. R. 
619-108-201 (Supp. 1991). In the first instance, Bennion 
proffered the exhibits as evidence for his case in chief. (Tr. 
at 6, 8, 11, 12, 16, 23 and 26). Secondly, Bennion submitted his 
evidence while acknowledging that there was no forced pooling in 
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effect. Third, a review of the proffered evidence demonstrates 
that it contained some of the same documents and correspondence 
included in Graham1s memorandum. The Utah Rules of Evidence 
define relevant evidence, as "evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination more • . . or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
fact of consequence in the Board's hearing concerned whether or 
not Bennion had met all statutory requirements that would 
"entitle" him to an accounting by Board Order pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990). (Tr. at 28 and 29). 
Because the parties have stipulated in their separate pre-
hearing statements that there was no pooling, the exhibits 
proffered by Mr. Stirba cannot render Bennion!s pooling status 
more or less probable because neither party asserted that Bennion 
was involuntarily or voluntarily pooled at the time of the 
hearing. Thus, Bennion's exhibits were irrelevant to the issue 
at hand and the exhibits were properly not admitted as evidence 
consistent with Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which 
states "evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." This 
Court, in Bambrouah v. Buthers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Ut. 1976) held 
that a trial court should be given considerable discretion in 
deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant. The 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining is not a trial court. However, 
concerning issues of relevance, the discretion of the Board in 
this matter should be granted some deference because the Board is 
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chosen pursuant to its expertise in Oil and Gas areas. Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-6-4(2) (Supp. 1990). In this case, the Board construed 
the technical requirements of the statute and determined that 
Petitioner's exhibits 1-21 were irrelevant. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The Board, exercising its express authority to enter Summary 
Judgment when properly presented, determined that Bennionfs 
petition was properly disposed of upon the issue of when a 
nonconsenting owner was entitled to an accounting and payment of 
proceeds under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9. The Board construed the 
statute it is charged with interpreting and applied it in concert 
with this Court's decision in Bennion I. 
The Board's Order is entitled to "considerable weight." The 
Board properly exercised its discretion to exclude evidence 
submitted by Bennion as both untimely and as irrelevant. 
Therefore, the Board's Orders of January 24, 1991, and its 
Supplemental Order of January 24, 1991 should be upheld. 
DATED this day of August, 1991. 
Respectfully"submitted, 
Paul Van Dam z' ) f) 
Utah Attorney General // 
Thomas A. Mitchell, ^Es^. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining 
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
DOCKET NO. 
CAUSE NO. 
90-034 
139-66 
ooOoo 
Pursuant to the Request for Agency Action of Sam H. Bennion 
("Bennion"), this cause came before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 
Department of Natural Resources, on Thursday, September 27, 1990, 
commencing^ at the hour of 10:35 a.m. in the boardroom of the Division 
of Oil, Gas and Mining, 3 Triad Center, Suite 301, 355 West North 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At the hearing of September 27, 1990, argument of the parties was 
heard. The following Board members were present at the hearing: 
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman 
John M. Garr 
Richard B. Larsen 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Kent G. Stringham 
Chairman Gregory P. Williams recused himself from this 
hearing. 
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The Board was represented by Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq., Assistant 
Attorney General for the State of Utah, 
Appearances for the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining ("Division") 
were made by Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director; Ronald J. Firth, 
Associate Director, Oil and Gas; John R. Baza, Petroleum Engineer; 
and Brad Hill, Petroleum Geologist. 
Bennion was represented by Peter Stirba, Esq. and Barbara 
Zimmerman, Esq. 
Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham") was represented by Phillip Wm. 
Lear, Esq. and Danielle M. Ferron, Esq. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Board, having considered the testimony 
adduced, the exhibits received in evidence, and the pleadings of the 
parties and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place and purpose of the 
September 27, 1990, hearing was given to all interested parties as 
required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board. 
2. The Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter, of the 
Request for Agency Action and over all the parties interested therein 
and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate the Order hereinafter set 
forth. 
3. Pursuant to Section 40-6-9, Utah Code Annotated, (1988), 
Bennion has requested that the Board conduct an investigation and 
negotiation and that if unsuccessful, the Board order a hearing to 
determine why proceeds have not been paid to Bennion from the 
Jensen-Fenzl No. 1 Well, 1-20C5, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 
5 West and the Page 2-20C5 Well, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 
5 West, Duchesne County, State of Utah ("the Wells"). 
-2- 191 
4. Bennion's Request for Agency Action, sought relief as 
follows: 
a. That the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining initiate an 
investigation of the facts of this matter so that 
negotiations can take place as required by § 40-6-9(4) 
and (5), Utah Code Ann., (1988); 
b. that should negotiations be unsuccessful, the Board 
order a hearing as required by § 40-6-9(6), Utah Code 
Ann., (1988) ; 
c. that the Board order Graham to make an accounting to 
Bennion for all oil, gas and natural gas liquids 
produced from the wells; 
d. that the Board order Graham to pay Bennion all 
royalties and working interests not presently paid to 
Bennion for his share of oil, gas and natural gas 
liquids in the wells; 
e. that the Board find that Graham's delay of payments 
from the wells were knowing and intentional and without 
reasonable justification; 
f. that the Board assess a penalty to Graham of 
twenty-five percent of the payments owed Bennion and 
interest to the rate of 1.5% per month from the date of 
delinquency until paid; 
g. that the Board order that Bennion not be required to 
pay his share of costs of drilling of the Page 2-20C5 
well; and 
h. that the Board grant an award of attorney's fees and 
costs and such other relief as the Board found 
appropriate. 
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5. Graham filed a response to the Request for Agency Action on 
August 10, 1990, which asserted the affirmative defenses of the 
applicable statute of limitation, equitable doctrine of laches, 
equitable doctrine of estoppel, equitable doctrine of waiver, failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to 
name an indispensable party. Graham requested relief from the Board 
as follows: 
a* Dismissal of Bennion's Request for Agency Action with 
prejudice; 
b. in the alternative, that the matter be set for informal 
hearing; 
c. that Bennion's request for a penalty, interest and 
attorney's fees be dismissed; and 
d. that Graham be awarded reasonable attorney's fees, 
costs and such other relief as the Board deems 
appropriate. 
6. On August 16, 1990, counsel for the Petitioner, Barbara 
Zimmerman, and for the Respondent, Phillip Wm. Lear, appeared before 
Ronald J. Firth and Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq. for investigation and 
negotiation. At that time the parties exchanged information relevant 
to this matter. Graham's counsel took the position that in the 
absence of a voluntary or involuntary pooling order, Graham would not 
account to or make payments of proceeds to Bennion. However, the 
parties agreed to attempt to negotiate a voluntary pooling 
agreement. The parties also agreed to file Pre-hearing Issue 
Statements prior to the Board hearing of September 27, 1990, setting 
forth those issues of fact and law that might remain in dispute 
subsequent to the parties negotiations. The parties were unable to 
negotiate a voluntary pooling agreement or otherwise settle their 
dispute. The parties did prepare and file Pre-hearing Issue 
Statements prior to the September 27 hearing. On September 10, 1989, 
Graham filed a Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities bo 
Dismiss Petitioner's Request for Agency Action or in the Alternative 
for Summary Judgment. 
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7. On September 25, 1990, Bennion filed a Motion to Continue on 
the basis that Bennion had a scheduling conflict with regard to his 
company's annual operational meeting in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that 
Bennion's counsel had received no response from the Board to his 
letter of September 17, 1990, concerning what the Board would hear 
and argue at the hearing of September 27. Bennion filed no 
memorandum in opposition to Graham's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary 
Judgment. 
8- Both parties stipulate in their Pre-hearing Issue Statements 
that no pooling order, either voluntary or involuntary is in effect 
concerning the wells. Both parties also set forth as a central issue 
to be resolved at the hearing, the question of whether or not a 
pooling order is a pre-requisite to Bennion receiving proceeds from 
the wells. 
9. The Board finds that the Motion to Dismiss or in the 
alternative for Summary Judgment filed by Graham is properly before 
the Board. The Board also finds that the issue of whether or not a 
pooling order, voluntary or involuntary, is a pre-requisite for 
receiving an accounting under § 40-6-9(7), Utah Code Ann., (1988), is 
properly addressed at this time. 
10. The Board finds no basis for continuing this matter, in that 
Bennion has known at all relevant times of the date of the hearing, 
and that Bennion's counsel has been afforded adequate time in which 
to respond to the issue concerning the necessity of a pooling order 
for the relief requested under § 40-6-9(7), Utah Code Ann., (1988). 
11. The Board finds that the wells are located in a drilling 
unit established for common development of the entire lands 
comprising Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, USM, Duchesne 
County, Utah. 
12. The Board finds that when the drilling unit was established, 
Bennion was the owner of mineral interests in the spaced area which 
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ownership gives rise to correlative rights. By virtue of these 
correlative rights he is endowed with the opportunity to obtain his 
just and equitable share of the oil and gas from the pool which 
underlies the spaced area. The Board finds, based upon the 
undisputed evidence, that Bennion owns an undivided mineral interest 
in the north half of Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, 
USM., Duchesne County, Utah. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to § 40-6-9(4), Utah Code Ann., (1988), Bennion is 
entitled tu file a Request for Agency Action with the Board to 
conduct a hearing to determine why proceeds to which he alleges he is 
entitled have not been paid. 
2. Pursuant to § 40-6-9(5), Utah Code Ann., (1988), Bennion is 
entitled to have the Division conduct an investigation and 
negotiation as to why proceeds from the wells have not been paid. 
3. Where the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation, Bennion 
is entitled, pursuant to § 40-6-9(6) & (7), Utah Code Ann., (1988), 
to have the Board set a hearing to determine if the delay in payment 
of proceeds is without reasonable justification. 
4. The Board concludes that Graham is not required to furnish 
nonconsenting interest owners with monthly statements of costs 
incurred, evidence of the quantity of oil or gas produced or the 
amount of proceeds in the absence of voluntary or involuntary 
pooling. The Board finds a pooling agreement or order to be a 
condition precedent to Graham's obligation to provide such an 
accounting or payment of proceeds. 
5. The Board concludes that Bennion is not legally entitled, 
within the meaning at § 40-6-9(1) or (4), Utah Code Ann., (1989), to 
payment of proceeds, inasmuch as there is no pooling in effect. 
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6. The Board concludes that it cannot determine the amount of 
proceeds which may be payable to Bennion, even where the extent of 
his mineral interest is known, until and as part of a pooling order, 
the amounts set forth in § 40-6-6(6), Utah Code Ann., (1988), are 
determined. 
7. The Board concludes that the delay in payment of proceeds to 
Bennion is with reasonable justification. Therefore, the Board 
concludes that it may not order a complete accounting or order 
penalties as provided under § 40-6-9(6) & (7), Utah Code Ann., (1988). 
8. In order to obtain the relief Petitioner seeks, he must 
exercise his statutory remedies by petitioning the Board for a forced 
pooling order under § 40-6-6, Utah Code Ann., (1988), or enter into a 
voluntary pooling agreement. 
9. The Board concludes that Bennion has failed to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted as to the prayers set forth in 
the Findings of Fact at paragraphs, 4.c. thru 4.h. Rule 12(B)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where, on a Motion to 
Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded 
by the forum, the motion is to be treated as a Motion for Summary 
Judgment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P. 
10. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act expressly authorizes 
the Board, as an administrative agency, to dismiss actions under the 
circumstances identified in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, § 63-46B-l(4)(b), Utah Code Ann., (1990). 
11. The Board concludes that Graham's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be granted, dismissing with prejudice Bennion1s 
requests for relief set forth in the Findings of Fact at paragraphs, 
4.c. thru 4.h. 
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12. The relief ordered by the Board in this matter will prevent 
the drilling of unnecessary wells, prevent waste, and protect 
correlative rights. 
Substantial evidence now being available and considered by the 
Board upon which to reach its decision, the Board issues the 
following: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Petitioner's Request for Agency Action as referenced in the 
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 4.a, and 4.b is granted. 
2. The Board denies the Petitioner's Request for Agency Action 
as referenced in Findings of Fact, paragraphs 4.c. thru 4.h. These 
requests are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Respondent Graham's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Petitioner Bennion's Motion for Continuance is denied. 
4. The Board retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction over all 
matters covered by this Order and over all the parties affected 
thereby, and particularly reserves exclusive and continuing 
jurisdiction to make further orders as appropriate and as authorized 
by statute and regulation. 
DATED this 
JOY-W^O^N 199^1 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
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ADDENDUM B 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. BENNION 
FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING GRAHAM 
RESOURCES, INC., TO PAY ROYALTY 
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS ON THE 
JENSEN-FENZL #1 WELL 1-20C5, 
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, 
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
UTAH, AND THE PAGE #2-20C5 WELL, 
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, 
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
UTAH 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER TO POST-
HEARING MOTIONS 
DOCKET NO. 90-034 
CAUSE NO. 139-66 
On the ^ d a v 
ooOoo 
, 1991, the Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining of the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah 
granted the motion of Respondent Graham Resources, Inc., 
(hereinafter "Graham") for summary judgment. The Board prepared 
and delivered to the parties a proposed Order containing Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The parties subsequently filed 
several post-hearing motions and memoranda in support of those 
motions. There are two matters raised by the post-hearing 
pleadings which are treated separately below. 
PETITIONER'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 15. 1990. 
AND RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
At the regularly scheduled September 27, 1990, hearing, 
argument on Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by the 
Board. Counsel for Petitioner Sam H. Bennion (hereinafter 
"Bennion"), moved to submit evidence in support of Bennion's case 
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in chief. Graham objected to admission of the evidence on two 
grounds: 1) that the evidence in support of Bennion's case in 
chief was irrelevant to the issues raised by Graham's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and 2) that the evidence had not been timely 
filed pursuant to the Board's Procedural Rules. 
The Board sustained Graham's objection to the admission of the 
offered evidence on both grounds. At the time the Board sustained 
Graham's objection, it determined that none of the evidence 
proffered would be admitted into evidence or constitute a part of 
the administrative record. On October 15, 1990, counsel for 
Bennion submitted a letter to the Board requesting that the 
evidence be included in the record to make the record complete for 
appeal. Graham filed an objection to Bennion's letter and moved to 
strike it from the record. On November 12, 1990, The Board set 
Graham's Motion for argument and provided for the submission of 
memoranda in support of the parties' positions regarding inclusion 
of the proffered evidence in the record. On December 6, 1990, at 
the time set for hearing on Graham's Motion, the Board, after 
reviewing the Pleadings filed by each party and hearing oral 
argument, retired to consider its decision. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Board, being fully advised in the 
premises, does hereby enter its Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law 
and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The evidence submitted by Bennion at the time of the 
hearing was submitted in support of Bennion's original request for 
2 
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Agency action. 
2. The evidence submitted by Bennion, which the Board ruled 
inadmissablef is a proffer of evidence in the course of the 
administrative proceeding. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Bennion is entitled to make a proffer of evidence and to 
have the record reflect the proffer, objection and ruling, and is 
entitled to have the proffered evidence included in the hearing 
documents to insure that any appeal taken will be upon a complete 
record. 
ORDER 
The exhibits entitled "Plaintiff's Exhibits," containing 
twenty-one separately numbered documents, are hereby ordered 
included and made a part of the record as Plaintiff's proffer of 
unadmitted evidence at the hearing of September 27, 1990. 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Respondent Graham has filed an objection to Board's proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and Petitioner 
Bennion has filed an objection to Graham Resources' recommendations 
regarding the proposed Order and has proposed his own 
recommendations for the Order. Graham has requested that the Board 
expand the scope of its Order to embrace the objection raised by 
Graham to Bennion's petition that Bennion has failed to sign a 
Division order. Bennion objects, arguing that the Division order 
3 
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issue was not within the scope of the September 27th hearing. 
Although the issue is raised by the pleadings, the Acting Chairman 
of the Board, in teleconferences with counsel for the parties, 
requested that the parties restrict their arguments on Graham's 
Motion for Summary Judgment to the issue of whether a pooling and 
communitization agreement or order is a prerequisite to the relief 
sought by the Petitioner. Argument at the September 27th hearing 
was limited to those issues, and the Board finds that it is 
unnecessary and would perhaps be inequitable to rule on Graham's 
other bases for resisting Petitioner's request. 
Mr. Bennion requests that Paragraph 8 of the Findings be 
amended to remove the word "stipulation" in reference to the pre-
hearing issue statements filed by each of the parties. Although 
not in the form of a single document signed by both parties, the 
Board Finds that both parties did stipulate to the fact that no 
pooling order was then in effect. Bennion also requests that the 
Board amend Paragraph 9 to clearly reflect that the only issue 
considered by the Board was whether or not a pooling order was a 
prerequisite for receiving an accounting. The issues before the 
Board, upon which the Board ruled, were that the existence of a 
pooling or communitization agreement or order is a prerequisite to 
both an accounting and to payment of proceeds of production. 
Accordingly, the Board declines to incorporate the objections 
or requests of either party in its Finding of Fact, Conclusions of 
4 
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Law and Order. 
£& & SO ORDERED this^H day of January, 1991, 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
W. Carter, Acting Chairman 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
ADDENDUM C V\: 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHci 
rn f£3 
- - • Am W 
SAM H. 
-VS-
GRAHAM 
BENNION, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
RESOURCES, INC., ) 
Defendant. ) 
C i v i l No. 87-4082 
O R D E R 
The Court has before it the motions of Graham Resources, Inc. 
(Resources) to dismiss and to quash service of process, or in the 
alternative, to transfer or stay these proceedings, or again in 
the alternative, for a more definite statement. The Court has 
examined the entire record in the case, and in accordance with 
the views expressed in the memorandum decision accompanying this 
order, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of 
defendant Graham Resources, Inc., to dismiss be, and the same is 
hereby, GRANTED. 
DATED this ay of February, 1988. 
<r/Zx^*f^« Or ( ^^AZIZ^ 
MARION J. CAL 
UNITED STAT 
3TER, CHIEF JUDGE 
DISTRICT COURT 
EXHIBIT "C" 
— — r^zj 
0 1 . . i . . i - % . ' » * « • * - • 
DlirTKI.'T COURT 
ADDENDUM D . D'-STRiST OF UTAH 
fiY 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
SAM H. BENNION, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, AND ORDER DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S 
-vs- COMPLAINT WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE 
GRAHAM ENERGY, LTD., 
Civil No: C-88-535W 
Defendant. 
This matter is before the court on defendant's motion 
to dismiss, or in the alternative, to abstain or to stay these 
proceedings. A hearing was held on this motion on January 4, 
1990. The defendant, Graham Energy, Ltd., was represented by 
Phillip William Lear. The plaintiff, Sam H. Bennion ("Bennion") 
was represented by Peter Stirba. Prior to the hearing, the court 
had reviewed carefully the memoranda submitted by the parties. 
After taking the matter under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and the facts and now renders the following 
memorandum decision and order. 
Background 
Bennion is the owner of an undivided mineral interest 
in the N h of Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, U.S.M. 
in Duchesne County, Utah. In September 1972 the Utah Board of 
Oil, Gas and Mining established a 640 acre drilling unit that 
includes Section 20. The Board authorized the drilling of one 
well. There is neither a voluntary-pooling agreement nor a 
forced-pooling order affecting the mineral interests in this 
case. 
In April 1973 the Texaco-Gulf-Jensen-Fenzl well was 
drilled. Since the Jensen-Fenzl well did not produce as 
expected, the Page well was drilled as a substitute well in 
February 1981. In April 1984 Graham Energy assumed operation of 
both wells. On April 17, 1985, the Board issued an order 
authorizing the drilling of a second well. On July 30, 1985, 
Bennion petitioned the Board for an order that would require 
Graham Energy to provide an accounting and to make royalty 
payments. The Board has taken no action on Bennion1s petition, 
and no hearing has been held. On June 15, 1988, Bennion filed a 
complaint in this action. 
Discussion 
Graham Energy asks this court to dismiss Bennion1s 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to 
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state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to 
join an indispensable party. Alternatively, defendant asks this 
court to abstain from taking jurisdiction or to stay this 
proceeding until the Board acts on plaintiff's petition- Bennion 
denies that grounds exist to dismiss the complaint and urges the 
court to move forward with these proceedings. For the reasons 
stated below, this court believes it is appropriate to abstain 
from exercising jurisdiction in this case. Because we believe 
that abstention is appropriate, we do not reach the other issues 
presented by this motion. 
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.. 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the 
Supreme Court articulated one of three commonly recognized 
versions of the abstention doctrine. The Court stated: 
Although a federal equity court does have 
jurisdiction of a particular proceeding, it 
may, in its sound discretion, whether its 
jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of 
diversity of citizenship or otherwise, 
"refuse to enforce or protect legal rights, 
the exercise of which may be prejudicial to 
the public interest"; for it "is in the 
public interest that federal courts of equity 
should exercise their discretionary power 
with proper regard for the rightful 
independence of state governments in carrying 
out their domestic policy." 
Id. at 317-18 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Pern, 
289 U.S. 352, 360 (1933) and Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 
176, 185 (1935)). In Burford the Sun Oil Company sought a 
3 
determination in federal court that an order of the Texas 
Railroad Commission was invalid. The Commission's order gave the 
defendant, G.E. Burford, permission to drill oil wells in the 
East Texas oil field. The Supreme Court described the complex 
nature of oil and gas regulation, the state's interests in 
developing coherent regulation in this area and the detailed 
system established in Texas to regulate the production of oil and 
gas. The Court also noted that decisions by the Commission were 
subject to judicial review, ultimately by the Texas Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court emphasized the inability of federal 
courts to make an important "contribution to the well organized 
system of regulation and review which the Texas statutes provide. 
. . . Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal 
conflict with the State policy, are the inevitable product of 
this double system of review." Id. at 327. 
Since its decision in Burford the Supreme Court has 
made clear that "[a]bstention from the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. • . . [It] is an 
extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District 
Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." Colorado 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
813 (1976) . Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit has properly 
recognized that abstention is appropriate in certain situations. 
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In Robert-Gav Energy Enterprises v, State Corp, Comm'n of Kansas, 
753 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1985), the Tenth Circuit followed Burford 
and affirmed the dismissal of a federal complaint based upon the 
abstention doctrine• Robert-Gay involved an attack in federal 
court on an order by the State Corporation Commission of Kansas, 
which placed oil and gas production limits on the plaintiff's 
well. The Tenth Circuit emphasized two factors. First, the 
court reviewed the state regulatory system and found that "the 
State of Kansas has 'established its own elaborate review system 
for dealing with the geological complexities of oil and gas 
fields."1 Id. at 860. Second, the court examined Kansas 
statutes that provide for state judicial review of Commission 
decisions and explained: "We are satisfied that Kansas statutes 
provide Tor adequate state court review of orders of the State 
Corporation Commission of Kansas." Id. at 861. The Tenth 
Circuit concluded that abstention under Burford was proper. 
We believe the present case is one in which abstention 
is appropriate under Burford and cases following it. Several 
factors support this conclusion. First, Utah, like Texas and 
Kansas, has a strong interest in developing a coherent policy for 
the production of oil and gas. The Utah State Supreme Court, 
citing the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, explained that Utah 
has an "interest in developing natural resources in a manner that 
5 
will prevent waste, foster greater ultimate recovery, and protect 
the correlative rights of all property owners." Bennion v. Utah 
State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1983). 
Utah also has other legitimate interests such as insuring that 
tax revenues flow from the production of oil and gas. 
Second, in pursuit of these and related interests, Utah 
has established an elaborate system to regulate the production of 
oil and gas. In 1953 the Utah State Legislature enacted the Oil 
and Gas Conservation Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 -18 (1988). 
Within the State Department of Natural Resources the Act 
established the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-15 (1988). The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining is the 
policymaking body for the Division, Utah Code Ann. § 4 0-6-4 
(1988), and the Board is given broad jurisdiction over oil and 
gas production. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5 (1988). Of particular 
importance in this case, "[a]ny party entitled to proceeds of 
production in oil and gas may file a petition with the Board of 
Oil, Gas and Mining to conduct a hearing to determine why these 
proceeds have not been paid.11 Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9(4) (Supp. 
1989) . The Board must attempt to resolve the matter first by 
investigation and negotiation with the parties. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-9(5) (Supp. 1989). If negotiations fail, the Board is 
authorized to conduct a hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 4 0-6-9(6) 
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(Supp. 1989) . The Board has the power to "summon witnesses, 
administer oaths, and require the production of records, books, 
and documents for examination . . .'? Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-11(1) 
(1988). "If, after a hearing, the board finds the payment of 
proceeds delay is without reasonable justification, it may order 
a complete accounting . . . " and assess penalties and interest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9(7) (Supp. 1989). The Board may also 
assess fines for violation of the statutory provisions "or any 
permit, rule, or order" made pursuant to the statute. Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-6-11(4) (1988). 
Third, the statute provides for judicial review of -the 
Board's decisions. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1989) 
the Utah State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the 
Board's final orders. 
Finally, this case, apparently unlike Colorado River 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States. 424 U.S. 800 (1976), 
raises questions "bearing on state policy . . . " Id. at 815. 
The parties ask this court to resolve questions involving what 
duties well operators owe to mineral interest owners and the 
circumstances under which multiple wells may be drilled in each 
drilling unit. "These questions of regulation of the industry by 
the State administrative agency . . . so clearly involves basic 
problems of [state] policy that equitable discretion should be 
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exercised to give the [state] courts the first opportunity to 
consider them. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943), 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's complaint is 
dismissed without prejudice. 
This memorandum decision and order will suffice as the 
court's action on defendant's motion. No further order need be 
prepared by counsel. / 
Dated t h i s ^> xr—~~cTay of February, 1990. 
David K. Winder 
United States District Judge 
Mailed a copy of the -fejFeqc^ pg to the following named 
counsel this J X ~"*~ day of February, ' l"590'. 
Phillip Wm. Lear, Esq. 
R. Stephen Marshall, Esq. 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Peter Stirba, Esq. 
Reid Tateoka, Esq. 
Bryan A. Larson, Esq. 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUM E 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. 
BENNION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING 
GRAHAM RESOURCES, INC. TO PAY 
ROYALTY AND PRODUCTION 
PAYMENTS ON THE JENSEN-FENZL 
#1 WELL 1-20C5, SECTION 20, 
TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 5 
WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH, 
AND THE PAGE #2-20C5 WELL, 
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, 
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
UTAH. 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
OF 
SAM H. BENNION 
Docket No. 85-047 
Cause No. 139-47 
This matter came on for hearing before the Board of Oil, 
Gas and Mining ("Board") on June 28, 1990, on the motions of Graham 
Resources, Inc. ("Graham") to dismiss the petition (Request for 
Agency Action) of Sam H. Bennion; and this matter having been duly 
considered upon oral and written arguments of counsel and the Board 
having been fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Graham's motion to dismiss is 
granted without prejudice on grounds that the petitioner, Sam H. 
Bennion, has failed to timely prosecute. The petitioner is 
admonished that should he decide to refile this matter, the Board 
questions its authority to grant the relief requested until such 
time as the petitioner's interests have been either voluntarily or 
forced-pooled into the drilling unit. 
DATED this j[\ day of July, 1990. 
Approved as to form: 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
Peter Stirba, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Phillip Wm. Lear, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
-2-
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ADDENDUM F 
63-46M6 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
Hiatory; C, 1953,63-46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, 5 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25. 6346b-16(4r at the end in Subsection (l)(a) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic change 
meat, effective April 25,1986, deleted "except Effective Dates. — LSWB 1987, cL 161, 
that final agency action from infonnal a j^udi* § 315 makes the act effective on January 1> 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 193$^  
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Fraction of district court. the district court will no longer function as in-
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediata appellate court except to review in-
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings dp novo pursu: 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Stt- ant to Subsection (IXa) of this section. In re 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, Topik, 762 P.2d 82 (Utah Ci Ajpp. 1988). 
63-46b-16, Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court, 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the Teview proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of t|ie agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following; 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agfency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious* 
History: C, 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2Xa); and euV 
1987, ch, 181, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
ment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "As cedUreM in Subsection* (2)(a) and (2)(b). 
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Effective Dates. — Law* 1987, ch. 161, 
Court of Appeals" for 'The Supreme Court or § 3 ^
 mafo& the act effective on January 1, 
other appellate court designated by etatute* in jgg^ 
Subjection (1); inserted "with the appropriate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court trict court will no longer function as intermedi-
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency ate appellate court except to review informal 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed- adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
ings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme § 63-46b-l5(lXa). In re Topik, 761 P.2d- 32 
Court or Court of Appeal** Therefore, the dis- (Utah Ct App. 1S88)» 
63-46M7. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an Ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may; 
(i) order agency action required by law, 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for fiirther proceedings, 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are ire-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute* 
History; C. 1963,6S-46b-17, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1987, ch. 161, § 273. 1988. 
Effective Dates. — Law* 1987, ch. 161, 
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ADDENDUM G 
BOARD AND DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 40-6-1 
CHAPTER 6 
BOARD AND DIVISION OF OIL, GAS 
AND MINING 
Sunset Act -
July 1, 1993. 
- Section 63-55-7 provides that the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining terminates on 
Section Section 
40-6-1. Declaration of public interest. 40-6-10. 
40-6-2. Definitions. 
40-6-3. Waste prohibited. 
40-6-4. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining ere- 40-6-11. 
ated — Functions — Appointment 
of members — Terms — Chairman 
— Quorum. 
40-6-5. Jurisdiction of board — Rules. 
40-6-6. Drilling units — Establishment — 
Pooling of interests — Order —- 40-6-12. 
Operation. 
40-6-7. Agreements for repressuring or pres- 40-6-13. 
sure maintenance or cycling or re-
cycling operations — Plan for de- 40-6-14. 
velopment and operation of pool or 
field. 
40-6-8. Field or pool units — Procedure for 
establishment — Operation. 
40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — 40-6-15. 
Proceeding on petition to deter-
mine cause of nonpayment — 
Remedies. 40-6-16. 
40-6-9.5. Permits for crude oil production — 40-6-17, 
Application — Bond requirement 
— Closure of facilities — Avail- 40-6-18. 
ability of records. 
Procedures — Adjudicative proceed-
ings — Emergency orders — Hear-
ing examiners. 
Power to summon witnesses, admin-
ister oaths and require production 
of records — Enforcement — Pen-
alties for violation of chapter or 
rules — Illegal oil or gas — Civil 
liability. 
Evasion of chapter or rules — Penal-
ties — Limitation of actions. 
Restrictions of production not autho-
rized. 
Tax on oil and gas at well — Use — 
Collection — Penalty and interest 
on delinquencies — Payment 
when product taken in-kind — In-
terests exempt. 
Division created — Functions — Di-
rector of division — Qualifications 
of program administrators. 
Duties of division. 
Cooperative research and develop-
ment projects. 
Lands subject to chapter. 
40-6-1. Declaration of public interest. 
It is declared to be in the public interest to foster, encourage, and promote 
the development, production, and utilization of natural resources of oil and 
gas in the state of Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste; to authorize 
and to provide for the operation and development of oil and gas properties in 
such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be obtained 
and that the correlative rights of all owners may be fully protected; to provide 
exclusive state authority over oil and gas exploration and development as 
regulated under the provisions of this chapter; to encourage, authorize, and 
provide for voluntary agreements for cycling, recycling, pressure mainte-
nance, and secondary recovery operations in order that the greatest possible 
economic recovery of oil and gas may be obtained within the state to the end 
that the land owners, the royalty owners, the producers, and the general 
public may realize and enjoy the greatest possible good from these vital natu-
ral resources. 
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(12) "Producer" means the owner or operator 
of a well capable of producing oil and gas. 
(13) "Product" means any commodity made 
from oil and gas. 
(14) "Waste" means: 
(a) the inefficient, excessive, or improper 
use or the unnecessary dissipation of oil or 
gas or reservoir energy; 
(b) the inefficient storing of oil or gas; 
(c) the locating, drilling, equipping, oper-
ating, or producing of any oil or gas well in a 
manner that causes reduction in the quan-
tity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from 
a reservoir under prudent and economical 
operations, or that causes unnecessary wells 
to be drilled, or that causes the loss or de-
struction of oil or gas either at the surface or 
subsurface; 
(d) the production of oil or gas in excess of: 
(i) transportation or storage facilities; 
(ii) the amount reasonably required 
to be produced in the proper drilling, 
completing, testing, or operating of a 
well or otherwise utilized on the lease 
from which it is produced; and 
(e) underground or above ground waste in 
the production or storage of oil or gas. 
(15) Oil and gas as defined in this chapter 
shall not include gaseous or liquid substances de-
rived from coal, oil shale, tar sands, or other hy-
drocarbons classified as synthetic fuels. isas 
40-6-3. Waste prohibited. 
The waste of oil or gas is prohibited. 1983 
40-6-4. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining created — 
Functions — Appointment of members 
— Terms — Chairman — Quorum. 
(1) There is created within the Department of Nat-
ural Resources the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. The 
board shall be the policymaking body for the Division 
of Oil, Gas and Mining. Upon the effective datejof this 
act the terms of the present members oi .tlhe/ board 
shall expire. ! '' ' j 
(2) The board shall then consist of seven members 
appointed by the governor, with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. No more than four members shall 
be from the same political party. The members shall 
have the following qualifications: 
(a) two members knowledgeable in mining 
matters; 
(b) two members knowledgeable in oil and gas 
matters; 
(c) one member knowledgeable in ecological 
and environmental matters; 
(d) one member who is a private land owner, 
owns a mineral or royalty interest and is knowl-
edgeable in those interests; and 
ie> one member who is know\edgeab\e \n geo-
logical matters. 
(3) The terms of office of four of the members first 
appointed shall expire March 1, 1985, and the terms 
of the remaining three members shall expire on 
March 1, 1987. Their successors shall be appointed 
for terms of four years. Vacancies occurring by reason 
of death, resignation, or other cause shall be filled by 
the appointment of another person by the governor, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, for the 
unexpired term of the person whose office was va-
cated and shall have the same qualifications as his 
predecessor. 
(4) The board shall appoint its chairman from the 
membership. Four members of the board shall consti-
tute a quorum for the transaction of business and the 
holding of hearings. isss 
40-6-5. Jurisdiction of board — Rules. 
(1) The board has jurisdiction over all persons and 
property necessary to enforce this chapter. The board 
shall enact rules in accordance with the Utah Admin-
istrative Rulemaking Act. 
(2) The board shall adopt rules and make orders as 
necessary to administer the following provisions: 
(a) Ownership of all facilities for the produc-
tion, storage, treatment, transportation, refining, 
or processing of oil and gas shall be identified. 
(b) Well logs, directional surveys, and reports 
on well location, drilling, and production shall be 
made and filed with the division. Logs of wells 
marked "confidential" shall be kept confidential 
for one year after the date on which the log is 
required to be filed, unless the operator gives 
written permission to release the log at an ear-
lier date. Production reports shall be: 
(i) filed monthly; 
(ii) accurate; and 
(iii) in a form that reasonably serves the 
needs of state agencies and private fee 
owners. 
(c) Monthly reports from gas processing plants 
shall be filed with the division. 
(d) Wells shall be drilled, cased, operated, and 
plugged in such manner as to prevent: 
(i) the escape of oil, gas, or water out of 
the reservoir in which they are found into 
another formation; 
(ii) the detrimental intrusion of water into 
an oil or gas reservoir; 
(iii) the pollution of fresh water supplies 
by oil, gas, or salt water; 
(iv) blowouts; 
(v) cavings; 
(vi) seepages; and 
(vii) fires. 
(e) The drilling of wells shall not commence 
without an adequate and approved supply of 
water as required by Chapter 3, Title 73. Thii 
provision is not intended to impose any addi-
tional legal requirements, but to assure that ex-
isting legal requirements concerning the use of 
water have been met prior to the commencement 
of drilling. 
(f) The operator shall furnish a reasonable per-
formance bond or other good and sufficient 
surety, conditioned for the performance of the 
duty to: '. 
(i) plug each dry or abandoned well; »^ J* 
(ii) repair each well causing waste or pol-
lution; and * 
(iii) maintain and restore the well site. 
ig> Production from wells shall be separated 
into oil and gas and measured by means and 
upon standards that will be prescribed by the 
board and will reflect current industry sta* 
dards. 
(h) Crude oil obtained from any reserve pit, 
disposal pond or pit, or similar facility, and anjr 
accumulation of nonmerchantable waste crude 
oil shall be treated and processed, as prescribed 
by the board. 
(i) Any person who produces, sells, purchases, 
acquires, stores, transports, refines, or procesMt 
oil or gas or injects fluids for cycling, presfun 
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maintenance, secondary or enhanced recovery, or 
salt water disposal in this state shall maintain 
complete and accurate records of the quantities 
produced, sold, purchased, acquired, stored, 
transported, refined, processed, or injected for a 
period of at least six years. The records shall be 
available for examination by the hoard or its 
agents at any reasonable time. Rules enacted to 
administer th.is subsection shall be consistent 
with applicable federal requirements. 
(j) Any person with an interest in a lease shall 
be notified when all or part of that interest in the 
lease is sold or transferred. 
(3) The board has the authority to regulate: 
(a) all operations for and related to the produc-
tion of oil or gas including: 
(i) drilling, testing, equipping, complet-
ing, operating, producing, and plugging of 
wells; and 
(ii) reclamation of sites; 
(b) the spacing and location of wells; 
(c) operations to increase ultimate recovery, 
such as: 
(i) cycling of gas; 
(ti) the maintenance of pressure; and 
(iii) the introduction of gas, water, or 
other substances into a reservoir; 
(d) the disposal of salt water and oil-field 
wastes; 
(e) the underground and surface storage of oil, 
gas, or products; and 
(0 the flaring of gas from an oil well. 
(4) For the purposes of administering this chapter, 
the board may designate: 
(a) wells as: 
(i) oil wells; or 
(ii) gas wells; and 
(b) pools as: 
(i) oil pools; or 
(ii) gas pools 
(5) The board has exclusive jurisdiction over: 
(a) class II injection wells, as defined by the 
. federal Environmental Protection Agency or any 
successor agency; and 
(b) pits and ponds in relation to these injection 
wells. • 
(6) The board has* jurisdiction: 
(a) to hear any questions regarding multiple 
mineral development conflicts with oil and gas 
operations if there: 
(i) is potential injury to other mineral de-
posits on the same lands; or 
(ii) are simultaneous or concurrent opera-
tions conducted by other mineral owners or 
lessees affecting the same lands; and 
(b) to enter its order or rule with respect to 
: those question?. 
<„ (7) The board has enforcement powers with respect 
• operators of minerals other than oil and gas as are 
t at forth in Section 40-6-11, for the sole purpose of 
I fjfercing multiple mineral development issues, less 
- #4-6. Drilling units — Establishment — Pool-
, ing of interests — Order — Operation. 
(I) The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, may order 
• It establishment of drilling units covering any pool. 
'* tfiuch orders shall be made upon terms and condi-
^tm that are just and reasonable. Drilling units 
. fell be of uniform size and shape for the entire pool 
I ok* the board finds that it must make an exception 
/ In to geologic or geographic or other factors. When 
^*mury th* board may divide any pool into zones 
and establish drilling units for each zone, which units 
may differ in size and shape from those established in 
any other zone The order shall include: 
<a> the acreage to he embraced within each 
drilling unit and the shape of each drilling unit 
as determined by the board but the unit shall not 
be smaller than the maximum area that can be 
efficiently and economically drained by one well; 
and 
(b) the direction that no more than one well 
shall be drilled for production from the common 
source of supply on any drilling unit, and the 
authorized location of the well. 
(2) The bourd may modify the order to provide an 
exception to the authorized location of the well when 
the board finds such a modification to be reasonably 
necessary. 
(3) An order establishing drilling units for a pool 
shall cover all lands determined by the board to be 
underlaid by the pool, and the order may be modified 
by the board to include additional areas determined 
to be underlaid by the pool. 
(4» After an order fixing drilling units has been 
entered by the board, the drilling of any well into the 
pool at a location other thnn authorized by the order, 
is prohibited. The operation of any well drilled in vio-
lation of an order fixing drilling units is prohibited. 
The board may modify the order to decrease or in-
crease the size of the drilling units or permit addi-
tional wells to be drilled within the established units. 
(5) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may 
pool their interests for the development and operation 
of the unit. In the absence of voluntary pooling, the 
hoard may enter an order pooling all interests in the 
drilling unit for the development and operation. The 
order shall be made upon terms and conditions that 
are just and reasonable. Operations incident to the 
drilling of a well upon any portion of a unit covered 
by a pooling order shall be deemed for all purposes to 
l»e the conduct of the operations upon each separately 
owned tract in the unit by the several owners. That 
portion of the production hllocet^i or applicable to 
each tract included il^ affunit {wver^d by a pooling 
order shall, when produced, be1 deified far all pur-
poses to have been pndduced from each tract by a well 
drilled thereon. 
(6) Each pooling order shall permit the drilling and 
operation of a well on the drilling unit by any owner 
within the drilling unit, and shall provide for the pay-
ment of the costs, including a reasonable charge for 
supervision and storage facilities, as provided in this 
subsection. 
In relation to each owner who refuses to agree to 
hear his proportionate share of the costs of the drill-
ing and operation of j jtbio well (the nonconsenting 
owner), the order sh^l||pr<|uide for reimbursement to 
the owner paying for t|w drilling and operation of the 
well (consenting ow«eta| ij for the nonconsenting 
owner's share of the litiiMf put of, and only out of, 
production from the un,kta(kijibutable to his tract. The 
board is authorized to! provide that the consenting 
owners shall own and bej Entitled to receive all pro-
duction from the well, applicable to each tract or in-
terest, and obligations jUyjable out of production, 
until the consenting f r i e r s have been paid the 
amount due under the w ^ P of the pooling order or 
order relating to the drillM; unit. In the event of any 
dispute as to such costs,itntfboard shall determine the 
proper costs. The order! Biiiil provide that each con-
senting owner shall be jnJitltl 
royalty or similar obligation 
duction of the well apnlijjab 
jed to receive, subject to 
k the share of the pro-
e to his interest in the 
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unit, and, unless he has agreed otherwise, his propor-
tionate part of the nonconsenting owner's share of 
such production until costs are recovered as provided 
in this subsection; and that each nonconsenting 
owner shall he entitled to_rcccMve, suhjecTj^jjuyttit^ 
^ oFTrtntriar obi i gat ions .The share of production from 
the well appTicahle'to HislHteresTTiif nieTunlt after the 
^consenting owners have recoveredTrom the~1ioricon-_ 
senting owner's share of productXonjthe followirig: 
(a) Tn respect to every such wellllJO^rof the 
nonconsenting owner's share of the cost of sur-
face equipment beyond the wellhead connections 
(including, but not limited to, stock tanks, sepa-
rators, treaters, pumping equipment, and pip-
ing), plus 100% of the nonconsenting owner's 
share of the cost of operation of the well com-
mencing with first production and continuing 
until the consenting owners have recovered these 
costs, it being intended that the nonconsenting 
owner's share of these costs and equipment will 
be that interest which would have been charge-
able to the nonconsenting owner had he initially 
agreed to pay his share of the costs of the well 
from the beginning of the operation; and 
(b) An amount to be determined by the board 
but not less than 150% nor to exceed 200% of that 
portion of the costs and expenses of staking the 
location, wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rig-
ging up, drilling, reworking, deepening or plug-
ging back, testing, and completing, and the cost 
of equipment in the well (to and including the 
wellhead connections), after deducting any cash 
contributions received by the consenting owners. 
A reasonable interest charge may be included if 
the board finds it appropriate. 
(7) The order shall provide that: 
(a) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drill-
ing unit, which tract is subject to a lease or other 
contract for the development of oil and gas, shall 
have the costs provided in Subsection (6) paid 
from the production attributable to that tract. 
Any royalty interest or other interest not liable 
for the costs of production shall be jpnid J>y the 
nonconsenting owner and not from tpd produc-
tion attributable to the tract until the consenting 
owners have recovered the costs as provided in 
Subsection (6). '
 t 
(b) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drill-
ing unit, which is not subject to a lease or other 
contract for the development of oil and gas, shall 
receive as a royalty the average landowners roy-
alty attributable to each tract within the drilling 
unit, determined prior to the commencement of 
drilling and payable from the production allo-
cated to each tract until the consenting owners 
have recovered the costs as provided in Subsec-
tion (6). 
(8) The operator of a well umjerji pooling order in 
which there a,re nonconsenting o^vners sRairttarnjsfi 
the nonconsenting owners with 'monthly statements 
of all costs incurred, together with the quantity of oil 
or gas produced, and the amount of proceeds realized 
from the sale of this production during the preceding 
month. If and when the consenting owners recover 
from a nonconsenting owner's relinquished interest 
the amounts provided for in Subsection (6) of this 
section, the relinquished interest of the nonconsent-
ing owner shall automatically revert to him; and the 
nonconsenting owner shall from that time own the 
same interest in the well and the production from it, 
and be liable for the further costs of the operation as 
if he had participated in the initial drilling and oper-
ation. These costs are payable out of production un-
less otherwise agreed between the nonconsenting 
owner and the operator. IMS 
40-6-7. Agreements for represauring or pres-
sure maintenance or cycling or recy-
cling operations — Finn for develop-
ment and operation of pool or field. 
(1) An agreement for repressuring or pressure 
maintenance operations, cycling or recycling opera-
tions, including the extraction and separation of liq-
uid hydrocarbons from natural gas, or for carrying on 
any other methods of unit or cooperative development 
or operation of a field or pool or a part of either, is 
authorized and may be performed, and shall not be 
held or construed to violate any statutes relating to 
trusts, monopolies, or contracts and combinations in 
restraint of trade, if the agreement is approved by the 
board as being in the public interest and promotes 
conservation, increases ultimate recovery and pre-
vents waste of oil or gas provided the agreement pro-
tects the correlative rights of each owner or producer. 
(2) A plan for the development and operation of a 
pool or field shall be presented to the board and may 
be approved after notice and hearing. tees 
40-6-8. Field or pool units — Procedure for es-
tablishment — Operation. 
(1) The board may hold a hearing to consider the 
need for the operation as a unit of one or more pools 
or parts of them in a field. 
(2) The board shall make an order providing for 
the unit operation of a pool or part of it, if the board 
finds that: 
(a) Such operation is reasonably necessary for 
the purposes of this chapter; and 
(b) The value of the estimated additional re-
covery of oil or gas substantially exceeds the esti-
mated additional cost incident to conducting such 
operations. 
(3) The order shall prescribe a plan for unit opera-
tions that shall include: 
(a) a description of the lands and of the pool or 
pools or parts of them to be so operated, termed 
the unit area; 
(b) a statement of the nature of the operations 
contemplated; 
(c) an allocation to the separately owned tracts 
in the unit area of all the oil and gas that is 
produced from the unit area and is saved, being 
the production that is not used in the conduct of 
operations on the unit area or not unavoidably 
lost. The allocation shall be in accord with the 
agreement, if any, of the interested parties. If 
there is no such agreement, the board *hall de-
termine the relative value, from evidence inuM»-v* 
duced at the hearing of the separately owned 
tracts in the unit area, exclusive of physical 
equipment, for development of oil and gas by unit 
operations, and the production allocated to each 
tract shall be the proportion that the relative 
value of each tract so determined bears to the 
relative value of all tracts in the unit area; 
(d) a provision for adjustment among the 
owners of the unit area (not including royalty 
owners) of their respective investment in wells, 
tanks, pumps, machinery, materials, equipment, 
and other things and services of value attribut-
able to the unit operations. The amount to be 
charged unit operations for any such item shall 
be determined by the owners of the unit area (not 
including royalty owners); but if the owners of 
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the unit area are unable to agree upon the 
amount or correctness, the hoard shall determine 
them. The net amount charged against the owner 
of an interest in a separately owned Unci, shall be 
considered expense of unit operation chargeable 
against his interest in the tract. The adjustments 
provided for may be treated separately and han-
dled by agreements separate from the unitization 
agreement; 
(e) a provision providing how the costs of unit 
operations, including capital investments, shall 
be determined and charged to the separately 
owned tracts and how these costs shall be paid, 
including a provision providing a procedure for 
the unit production allocated to an owner who 
does not pay the share of the cost of unit opera-
tions charged to such owner, or the interest of 
such owner, to be sold and the proceeds applied to 
the payment of such costs. The operator of the 
unit shall have a first and prior lien for costs 
incurred pursuant to the plan of unitization upon 
each owner's oil and gas rights and his share of 
unitized production to secure the payment of 
such owner's proportionate part of the cost of de-
veloping and operating the unit area. This lien 
may be established and enforced in the same 
manner as provided by Sections 38-1-8 to 38-1-26 
inclusive. For such purposes any nonconsenting 
owner shall be deemed to have contracted wi(h 
the unit operator for his proportionate part of the 
cost of developing and operating the unit area. A 
transfer or conversion of any owner's interest or 
any portion of it, however accomplished, after the 
effective date of the order creating the unit, shall 
not relieve the transferred interest of the opera-
tor's lien on said interest for the cost and expense 
of unit operations; 
(0 a provision, if necessary, for carrying or 
otherwise financing any owner who elects to be 
carried or otherwise financed, allowing a reason-
able interest charge for such service payable out 
of such owner's share of the production; 
(g) a provision for the supervision and conduct 
of the unit operations, in respect to which each 
owner shall have a percentage vote correspond-
ing to the percentage of the costs of unit opera-
tions chargeable against the interest of the 
owner; 
(h) the timeNwhen the unit operations shall 
commence, and the manner in which, and the 
circumstances under which, the unit operations 
shall terminate; 
(i) such additional provisions that are found to 
be appropriate for carrying on the unit opera-
tions, and for the protection of correlative rights; 
and 
(j) the designation of a unit operator. 
(4) No order of the board providing for unit opera-
tions of a pool or pools shall become effective unless 
and until the plan for unit operations prescribed by 
the division has been approved in writing by those 
owners who, under the board's order, will be required 
to pay 70%- of the costs of the unit operation, and also 
by the owners of 70% of the production or proceeds 
that will be credited to interests which are free of 
cost, such as royalties, overriding royalties, and pro-
duction payments, and the board has made a finding, 
either in the order providing for unit operations or in 
• supplemental order, that the plan for unit opera-
tions has been so approved. If the persons owning 
required percentage of interest in that unit area do 
not approve the plan for unit operations within a pe-
riod of six months from the date on which the order 
providing for unit operations is made, the order shall 
be inenYctive and shall be revoked by the board un-
leHH lor good i aiiHt* KIIOWII the board extends this time. 
<f>> An oider providing for unit operations may be 
amended by an order made by the board in the same 
manner and subject to the same conditions as an orig-
inal order providing for unit operations, provided: 
(a) If such an amendment affects only the 
rights and interests of the owners, the approval 
of the amendment by the owners of royalty, over-
riding royally, production payments and other 
such interests which are free of costs shall not be 
required. 
(b) No such order of amendment shall change 
the percentage for the allocation of oil and gas as 
established for any separately owned tract by the 
original order, or change the percentage for allo-
cation of cost as established for any separately 
owned tract by the original order. 
(6) The board, by an order, may provide for the 
unit operation of a pool or pools or parts thereof that 
embrace a unit area established by a previous order 
of the division. The order, in providing for the alloca-
tion of unit production, shall first treat the unit area 
previously established as a single tract, and the por-
tion of the unit production allocated shall then be 
allocated among the separately owned tracts included 
in the previously established unit area in the same 
proportions of |as | those specified in the previous or-
der 
(7) An order may provide for unit operations on 
less than the whole of a pool where the unit area is of 
such size and shape as may be reasonably required 
for that purpose, and the conduct will have no ad-
verse effect upon other portions of the pool. 
(8) All operations, including, but not limited to, the 
commencement, drilling, or operation of a well upon 
any portion of the unit area shall be deemed for all 
purposes the conduct of such operations upon each 
separately owned tract in the unit area by the several 
owners. The portions of the unit production allocated 
to a separately ownod tfrwjt in a uflitjarea shall, when 
produced, be detjmedj! fyr all purposes, to have been 
actually produced frohi such tract1 by a well drilled. 
Operations conducted pursuant to an order of the 
board providing for unit operations Bhall constitute a 
fulfillment of all the express or implied obligations 
for each lease or contract covering lands in the unit 
area to the extent that compliance with such obliga-
tions cannot l>e had because of the order of the board. 
<9> The portion of the unit production allocated to 
any tract, and the proceeds from the sale, shall be the 
property and income of the several owners, subject to 
the rights of royalty owners, to whom, or to whose 
credit, they are allocated or payable under the order 
providing for utity|||)fflfrrations. 
(10> No diiivihiK jftrallr or other contract relating to 
the sale or purc)i|$p JM productjon from a separately 
owned tract sha|) bin;1(jrmmated by the order provid-
ing for unit 0|x4ajim|» but shall remain in force and 
apply to oil andj$*s Allocated to such tract until ter-
minated in accoijefonitt with the provisions thereof. 
(11) Except tyfe^'iMctent that the parties affected 
agree and ad pitivjiicWl in (e) of Subsection (3) of this 
section, no ordtir JpV^yjding for unit operations shall 
be construed, to jnUbU tin a transfer of all or any part 
of the title of njrjl person to the oil and gas rights in 
any tract in thel tj|mtj')irea. All property, whether real 
or personal, ithatJllrhflW be acquired in the conduct of 
unit operations Maunder shall he acquired for the 
account of the (iv^p'r* (within the unit area and shall 
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(15) Oil and gas as defined in this chapter shall not include gaseous or 
liquid substances derived from coal, oil shale, tar sands, or other hydro-
carbons classified as synthetic fuels. 
History: C. 1953, 40-6-2, enacted by L. (7); redesignated former Subsections (7) and (8) 
1963, ch. 205,1 1; 1985, ch. 94, 5 1; 1989, ch. as present Subsections (8) and (9); added 
86, 5 1. present Subsection (10); and redesignated for-
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- mer Subsections (9) to (13) as present Subsec-
ment, effective July l, 1989, added Subsection tions (11) to (15). 
40-6-4- Board of Oil, Gas and Mining created — Functions 
— Appointment of members — Terms — Chair-
man — Quorum* 
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-240 provides 
that the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining is re-
pealed July 1, 1993. 
40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — Payment of 
proceeds — Requirements — Proceeding on peti-
tion to determine cause of nonpayment — Reme-
dies — Penalties. 
(1) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any 
well producing oil, gas, or related hydrocarbons in the state shall be paid to all 
persons legally entitled to these payments commencing not later than 180 
days after the first day of the month following the date of first sale and 
thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month within 
which payment is received by the payor for production unless other periods or 
arrangements are provided for in a valid contract with the person entitled to 
the proceeds. The payment shall be made directly to the person or persons 
entitled to the payment by the payor. The payment is considered to have been 
made upon deposit in the United States mail. 
(2) Payments shall be remitted to the person or persons entitled to proceeds 
from production annually for the aggregate of up to 12 months accumulation 
of proceeds if the total amount owed is $100 or less. 
(3) Any delay in determining any person legally entitled to an interest in 
the proceeds from production does not affect payments to all other persons 
entitled to payment. In instances where accrued payments cannot be made for 
any reason within the time limits specified in Subsection (2), the payor shall 
deposit all proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an 
escrow account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution 
using a standard escrow document form which deposit shall earn interest at 
the highest rate being offered by that institution for the amount and term of 
such demand deposits. The escrow agent may commingle money received into 
escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser, or other party legally 
responsible for payment. Payment of principal and accrued interest from these 
accounts shall be paid by the escrow agent to all persons legally entitled to 
them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal 
determination of entitlement to the payment. Applicable escrow fees shall be 
deducted from the payments. 
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(4) Any party entitled to proceeds of production in oil ana gas may iile a 
petition with the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to conduct a hearing to deter-
mine why these proceeds have not been paid. 
(5) Upon receipt of the petition the board shall set the matter for investiga-
tion and negotiation by the" division within 60 days. 
(6) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board 
may set a hearing within 30 days. If the board does not set a hearing, ail 
information gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be given 
to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in the court system. 
(7) If, after a hearing, the board finds the payment of proceeds delay is 
without reasonable justification, it may order a complete accounting and re-
quire the proceeds and interest to be paid into an interest bearing escrow 
account and set a date not later than 90 days for final distribution. The board 
may also assess a penalty of up to 25% of the proceeds and interest at the rate 
of V/2% per month from the date of delinquency until paid upon finding that 
the delay of payment of proceeds was known and intentional. 
(8) The penalty provisions of this chapter do not apply in the following 
instances: 
(a) the payor fails to make such payment otherwise required under this 
section in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah 
attorney objecting to the lack of good and marketable title of record in the 
party claiming entitlement to payment and furnishes a copy of the opin-
ion to the party for necessary curative action; 
(b) the payor receives information which, in the payor's good faith judg-
ment, brings into question the entitlement of the person claiming the 
right to the payment to receive that payment or which has rendered 
unmarketable the title of the payment, or which may expose the payor to 
the risk of multiple liability or liability to third parties if the payment is 
made. In that event, the payor may suspend those payments otherwise 
required by this chapter or, at the request and expense of the party claim-
ing entitlement whereupon the payor's own initiative, may interplead 
such fund in the manner provided by law in order to resolve such claims 
and avoid liability under this chapter; 
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor 
owed to the owner thereof making claim to payment is less than $100 at 
the end of any month; or 
(d) the party entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a 
division or transfer order acknowledging the proper interest to which the 
party claims to be entitled and setting forth the mailing address to which 
payment may be directed. 
History: G. 1953, 40-6-9, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 205, § 1; 1989, ch. 86, & 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1989, substituted 
present Subsections^ 1) to (4) for former Sub-
section (1) which read "The owner of a royalty, 
overriding royalty, production payment, 
unleaeed working interest, or any other inter-
est entitled to share in the proceeds from the 
sale of production from a well who has not re-
ceived these proceeds on a regular basis may 
file a petition with the Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining to conduct a hearing to determine why 
these proceeds have not been paid," redesig-
nated former Subsections 121 to (41 tf« present 
Subsections (5) to (7), and added Subsection (8). 
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R619-105-100 NATURAL RESOURCES 6$ 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS, AND 
MINING DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Request for Agency 
Action of John Doe, 
Petitioner for 
Docket No._ 
Cause No.. 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS, AND 
MINING DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
John Doe, 
v. 
Richard Doe, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
Request for 
Agency Action 
Docket No 
Cause No 
220. Docket and Cause Number. Upon the filing of 
a Request for Agency Action (petition), the secretary 
of the Boardwill assign a docket and a cause number 
to the matter. The secretary will enter the docket and 
cause numbers for the matter, together with the date 
of filing, on a separate docket provided for that pur-
pose. Thereafter, all pleadings offered in the same 
proceeding will bear the docket and cause numbers 
assigned and will be noted with the filing date upon 
the docket page assigned. 
230. Content and Size of Pleadings. Pleadings 
^ should be double-spaced and typed on plain, white, 
jg£ 8lh" x 11" paper. They must identify the proceeding 
pD by title and by docket and cause number, if known. 
Q All pleadings will contain a clear and concise state-
g j ment of the matter relied upon as a basis for the 
p pleading, together with an appropriate prayer for re-
Q lief when relief is sought. 
"*** 240. Amendments to Pleadings. The Board may, 
upon motion of the responsible party made at or be-
fore the hearing, allow any pleadings to be amended 
or corrected. Defects which do not substantially preju-
dice any of the parties will be disregarded. 
250. Signing of Pleadings. Pleadings will be signed 
by the party or the party's attorney and will show the 
signer's address and telephone number. The signa-
ture will be deemed to be a certification by the signer 
that he or she has read the pleading and that, he or 
she has taken reasonable measures to assure its 
truth. 
198S 40-6-1 etaeq. 
R619-105. Filing and Service. 
R619-105-100. Requests for Agency Action (Peti-
tions). 
R619-105-200. Responses. 
R619-105-300. Motions. 
R619-105-500. Exhibits. 
R619-105-600. Place of Filing. 
R619-105-700. Temporary Procedural Rulings. 
R619-105-800. Computation of Time. 
R619-105-100. Requests for Agency Action (Peti-
tions). 
All Requests for Agency Action filed by the 10th 
day of each calendar month may be considered by the 
Board for inclusion in the schedule of matters to be 
heard at its regularly scheduled meeting during the 
following calendar month. At the time the request is 
filed, petitioner will also file any motions, affidavits, 
briefs, or memoranda intended to be offered by pra 
tioner in support of said petition or motion. Petition 
will file with the petition a list of the names and lat 
known addresses of all persons required by statufc u 
be served or whose legally protected interest ma; at 
affected thereby. This rule will apply to all mattn 
initiated by the Board on its own motion as well un 
statements, briefs, or memoranda in support theme" 
prepared by the Division or by the Staff. Any petitiea 
or other materials filed after the 10th day w'any ca^  
endar month may be considered by the Board at n 
regularly scheduled meeting during the followirjf 
month only upon separate motion of petitioner road* 
at or before the hearing for good cause shown. 
R619-105-200. Responses. 
210. All responses to petitions, responses to mo-
tions by petitioner, and motions by respondent, to-
gether with all affidavits, briefs, or memoranda ia 
support thereof, filed by the 10th day of the month or 
two weeks before the scheduled hearing, whichever u 
earlier, in the month in which the hearing on ti* 
matter is scheduled (the "Response Date") may bt 
considered by the Board at its regularly scheduled 
meeting during that month. This rule will apply to all 
statements, briefs, or memoranda prepared by the Di 
vision or by the Staff in response to any petition or 
motion by petitioner. Any responses or other mate-
rials filed after the Response Date may be considered 
at the Board's regularly scheduled meeting for that 
month only upon separate motion of respondent made 
at or before the hearing for good cause shown. 
R619-105-300. Motions. 
All motions or responses to motions available to a 
petitioner or respondent at the time his or her Re-
quest for Agency Action or response is filed will be 
filed and served with the petition or response as pro-
vided in R619-105-100 and R619-105-200. Subse-
quent written motions, other than motions for excep-
tions to the filing requirements of these rules, must 
be filed by the time the response is due under 
R619-105-200. Oral responses and written responses 
to motions may be presented or filed at or before the 
hearing. Oral motions and responses to oral motions 
may be presented at the hearing. 
R619-105-500. Exhibits. 
Any exhibits intended to be offered by petitioners, 
respondents, and intervenors in support of matters 
set forth in their respective pleadings will be filed 
with the secretary of the Board on or before the time 
the response is due under R619-105-200. Any exhibit* 
filed by any party after the Response Date, but prior 
to the close of business two days before the hearing, 
may be considered by the Board at the hearing, but in 
such event the Staff will have the right to request a 
continuance of the proceedings until the next regu-
larly scheduled meeting of the Board or hearing date 
of the hearings examiner. (Any exhibits filed by any 
party after the close of business two days prior to the 
hearing, but before the hearing, may be considered by 
the Board at the hearing only upon separate motion 
of the party offering the exhibit made at the hearing 
for good cause shown. Any exhibits intended to be 
offered by the parties in rebuttal of evidence pre-
sented at the hearing will be presented at the hear-
ing. |rhe Board, on its own motion, may order the 
continuance of any proceeding until the next regu-
larly scheduled meeting of the Board in order to allow 
adequate time for the Staff to evaluate any evidence 
presented during the hearing. 
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M19-105-600. P lace of Filing. 
An original and 12 copies of all pleadings, affida-
vit*, briefs, memoranda and exhibits will be filed 
•ith the secretary of the Board. The Board may direct 
any party to provide additional copies as needed. 
R619-105-700. Temporary Procedural Rulings. 
The Chairman or designated Acting Chairman of 
ihe Board may issue temporary rulings on procedural 
motions that arise between Board hearings dates. 
These rulings will be reviewed and decided upon by 
the Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. 
R619-105-800. Computation of Time. 
In computing any period of time prescribed or al-
lowed by these rules, or by the Board, the day of the 
act, event, or default from which the designated pe-
riod of time begins to run will not be included. The 
last day of the period so computed will be included, 
unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, 
in which event the period runs until the end of the 
next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday. When the period of time prescribed or al-
lowed is less than seven days, intervening Saturdays, 
Sundays, or legal holidays will be excluded in the 
computation. 
ISM 40-6-1 etaeq. 
R619-106. Notice and Service. 
R619-106-100. Notice. 
R619-106-200. Personal Service of Request (Petition) 
and Related Pleadings. 
R619-106-300. Service of Other Pleadings. 
R619-106-400. Service on Attorney or Representa-
tive. 
R619-106-500. Proof of Service. 
R619-106-600. Additional Notices Upon Request. 
R619-106-700. Continuance of Hearing Without New 
Service. 
R619-106-100. Notice. 
Except as otherwise provided by law, before any 
rule, regulation, or order, or amendment thereof, will 
be made by the Board, notice of a hearing thereon 
will be given by publication in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the city of Salt Lake and county of Salt 
Lake, Utah, and in any newspapers of general circu-
lation published in the county where the land af-
fected or some part thereof is situated. Such notice 
will be issued in the name of the state and will be 
signed by the Board or its secretary. The notice will 
specify the title and docket and cause numbers of the 
proceeding, the time and place of hearing and 
whether the case is set for hearing before the Board 
or its designated hearing examiner. The notice will 
briefly state the purpose of the proceeding and gen-
eral nature of the order, rule, or regulation to be pro-
mulgated or effected. The notice will also state the 
name(8) of the petitioner and respondent, if any, and, 
unless the order, rule, or regulation is intended to 
apply to and affect the entire state, the notice will 
specify the land or resource affected by such order, 
rule, or regulation. In addition to published notice, 
the Board will give notice by mail to all parties. Such 
notice will be given by the 1st day of the month in 
which the hearing is held, but in no event less than 
fifteen days before the hearing. 
R619-106-200. Personal Service of Request (Peti-
tion) and Related Pleadings. 
210. In addition to the notice required by 
R619-106-100, wherever personal service is required 
by applicable law, the petitioner, or the Board in any 
proceeding initiated by the Board, will personally 
serve a copy of the petition and all pleadings filed 
with the secretary of the Board at the same time as 
the petition, other than exhibits, on any person re-
quired by statute to be served and on any respondent. 
The Board, on its own motion, may at any time also 
require petitioner to effect personal Bervice on any 
other person whose legally protected interests may, 
in the opinion of the Board, be affected by the pro-
ceedings. In Buch event the Board will prescribe the 
schedule for service of the request and any response 
thereto. 
220. Personal service under this rule will be ac-
complished no later than the 15th day of the month 
preceding the month in which the first hearing in the 
matter is held. 
230. Personal service may be made by any person 
authorized by law to serve summons in the same 
manner and extent as is provided by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure for the service of summons in civil 
actions in the district courts in this state. Proof of 
service wrfl be in the form required by law with re-
spect to service of process in civil actions. Persons 
otherwise entitled to personal service under these 
rules may be served by publication or mail in accor-
dance with Rule 4(0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. In such a case, any member of the Board may 
consider ex parte and rule upon the verified motion of 
any person seeking to accomplish service by publica-
tion or mail. 
R619-106-300. Service of Other Pleadings. 
A copy of all pleadings filed subsequent to the Re-
quest for Agency Action or Notice of Agency Action, 
which are not required to be personally served pursu-
ant to R619-106-200, will be served by mailing a copy 
thereof, postage prepaid, to all parties at the same 
time such pleadings are filed with the secretary of the 
Board. Exhibits need not be served on all parties, but 
may be examined by any party during the normal 
business hours of the Division by arrangement with 
the secretary of the Board. 
R619-106-400. Service on Attorney or Represen-
tative. 
When any party has appeared by attorney or other 
authorized representative, service upon such attorney 
or representative constitutes service upon the party 
he or she represents. 
R619-106-500. Proof of Service. 
There will appear on all documents required to be 
served a certificate of service in substantially the fol-
lowing form: 
I hereby certify that I have this day served the 
foregoing instrument upon all parties of record in this 
proceeding (by delivering a copy thereof in person to 
) (by mailing a copy thereof, properly ad-
dressed, with postage prepaid, to ). 
Dated at , this day of , 19, 
Signature 
or 
1 hereby certify that I have this day served the 
foregoing document by publication of a notice thereof 
in the (name of newspaper), a newspaper of general 
circulation in Salt Lake City and County and in 
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(name of newspaper(s)), (a) newspaper(s) of general 
circulation in the County of Copies of the 
notices are attached to this certification. 
Dated at , this day of , 19 
Signature 
R619-106-600. Additional Notices Upon Request. 
Any person desiring notification by mail from the 
Board or the Division of all matters before the Board 
will request the same in writing by filing with the 
Board or Division his or her name and address and 
designating the area or areas in which he or she has 
an interest and in which he or she desires to receive 
such notice. The Division may designate an annual 
fee, payable in advance, for such notice. 
R619-106-700. Continuance of Hearing Without 
New Service. 
Any hearing before the Board held after due notice 
may be continued by the person presiding at such 
hearing to a specified time and place without the ne-
cessity of notice of the same being again served or 
published. In the event of any continuance, a state-
ment thereof will be made in the record of the hear-
ing which is continued. If a hearing (not the delibera-
tion or decision) is continued indefinitely, the Board 
will provide new notice in accordance with these 
rules before hearing the matter. 
R619-107. Prehearing Conference. 
R619-107-100. Conference. 
R619-107-200. Order. 
R619-107-100. Conference. 
The Board, may in its discretion, on its own motion 
or motion of one of the parties made on or before the 
date the response is due, direct the parties or their 
representatives to appear at a specified time and 
place for a prehearing conference. At the conference, 
consideration will be given to: 
110. Simplification or formulation of the issues; 
120. The possibility of obtaining stipulations, ad-
missions of facts, and agreements to the introduction 
of documents; 
130. Limitation of the number of expert witnesses; 
140. Arranging for the exchange of proposed ex-
hibits or prepared expert testimony; and 
150. Any other matters which may expedite the 
proceeding. 
R619-107-200. Order. 
The Board will issue an order based upon its own 
findings or upon the recommendation of its desig-
nated hearing examiner, which recites the action 
taken at the conference and the agreements made as 
to any of the matters considered, and which limits the 
issues for hearing to those not disposed of by admis-
sions or agreements. Such order will control the sub-
sequent course of the proceeding before the Board un-
less modified by subsequent order for good cause 
shown. 
1988 40-6-1 et seq. 
R619-108. Conduct of Hearings. 
R619-108-1. Conduct of Hearings. 
R619-108-100. Public Hearings. 
R619-108-200. Rules of Evidence. 
R619-108-300. Testimony. 
R619-108-400. Failure to Appear. 
R619-108-500. Order of Presentation of Evidence. 
R619-108-600. Oral Argument and Briefs. 
R619-108-700. Record of Hearing. 
R619-108-800. Summons and FeeB. 
R619-108-900. Discovery. 
R619-108-1. Conduct of Hearings. 
Except us may otherwise be provided by law, hear-
ings before the Board will be conducted as follow* 
R619-108-100. Public Hearings. 
All hearings before the Board will be open to the 
public, unless otherwise ordered by the Board for 
good cause shown. All hearings shr.ll be open to all 
parties. 
101. Full Disclosure. The Board shall regulate the 
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of rele-
vant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable 
opportunity to present their positions. 
R619-108-200. Rules of Evidence. 
Thn Rnnrr4 ? k" n ,,CQ a° ^pprnprir?lp ruirir* fhrIlfj>K 
Rules of Evidence insofar as the same may be applica-
ble and not inconsistent with theae riilon, Notwith. 
standing this, on its own motion or upon objections of 
a party, the Board: 
201. May exclude evidence that is irrelevant, im-
material, or unduly repetitious. 
'20± Shall exclude evidence "privileged in the 
courts of Utah. 
203. May receive documentary evidence in the 
form of a copy of excerpt if the copy or excerpt con-
tains all pertinent portions of the original document 
204. May take official notice of any facts that could 
be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence, of the record or other proceedings before the 
Board, and of technical or scientific facts within the 
Board's specialized knowledge. 
R619-108-300. Testimony. 
Testimony presented to the Board in a hearing will 
be sworn testimony under oath or affirmation. 
R619-108-400. Failure to Appear. 
When a party to a proceeding fails to appear at a 
hearing after due notice has been given, the Board 
may dismiss or continue the matter or decide the 
matter against the interest of the party who fails to 
appear. 
R619-108-500. Order of Presentation of Evi 
dence. 
Unless otherwise directed by the Board at the hear-
ing, the order of procedure and presentation of evi-
dence will be as follows: 
510. Hearings upon Petition: 
511. Petitioner 
512. Respondent, if any 
513. Staff 
514. Intervenors 
515. Rebuttal by Petitioner 
520. Hearings upon motion of the Board: 
521. StafT 
522. Respondent 
523. Rebuttal by Staff 
11619-108-600. Oral Argument and Briefs. 
Upon the conclusion of the taking of evidence, the 
Board may, in its discretion, permit the parties to 
make oral arguments or submit additional briefs or 
memoranda upon a schedule to be designated by the 
Board. 
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R619-108-700. Record of Hearing. 
The Board will cause an official record of the pro-
ceedings to be made in all hearings as follows: 
710. The record may be made by means of a certi-
fied shorthand reporter employed by the Board or by 
a party desiring to employ a certified shorthand re-
porter at its own cost in the event that the Board 
chooses not to employ the reporter. If a party employs 
a certified shorthand reporter, the original transcript 
of the hearing will be filed with the Board. Parties 
desiring a copy of the certified shorthand reporter's 
transcript may purchase it from the reporter. 
720. The record of the proceedings may also be 
made by means of a tape recorder or other recording 
device if the Board determines that it is unnecessary 
or impracticable to employ a certified shorthand re-
porter and the parties do not desire to employ a certi-
fied shorthand reporter. 
730. If the Board deems it unnecessary, it will not 
have the record of a hearing transcribed unless re-
quested to do so by a party. Whenever a transcript or 
tape recording of a hearing is made, it will be avail-
able at the office of the Board for the use of the par-
ties, but may not be withdrawn therefrom. 
R619-108-800. Summons and Fees. 
810. Summons. The Board may issue summons on 
its own motion or upon request of a party for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of any 
pertinent paper, book, record, document, or other evi-
dence. 
820. Witness Fees. Each witness who appears be-
fore the Board will be entitled to receive the same 
fees and mileage allowed by law to witnesses in a 
district court, which amount will be paid by the party 
at whose request the witness is subpoenaed. Wit-
nesses appearing at the request of the Board will be 
paid from the funds appropriated for the use of the 
Board. Any witness summoned by a party other than 
the Board may, at the time of service of the summons, 
demand one day's witness fee and mileage in advance 
and unless such fee is tendered, the witness will not 
be required to appear. 
R619-108-900. Discovery. 
Upon the motion of a party and for good cause 
shown, the Board may authorize such manner of dis-
covery against another party, including the Division 
or the Staff, as may be prescribed by and in the man-
ner provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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R619-109. Decisions and Orders. 
R619-109-100. Board Decision. 
R619-109-200. Entry of Order. 
R619-109-300. Notice. 
R619-109-400. Emergency Orders. 
RG19-109-100. Board Decision. 
Upon reaching a final decision in any proceeding, 
the Board will prepare a decision to include findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. The Board 
may direct the prevailing party to prepare proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order, 
which will be completed within five days of the direc-
tion, unless otherwise instructed by the Board. Copies 
of the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and order will be served by the prevailing party upon 
all parties of record before being presented to the 
Board for signature. Notice of objection thereto will 
be submitted to the Board and all parties of record 
within five days after service. 
R619-109-200. Entry of Order. 
The Chairman or designated Acting Chairman of 
the Board will sign the order on any matter no later 
than 30 days following the end of the hearing on that 
matter, and cause the same to be entered and indexed 
in books kept for that purpose. The order will be effec-
tive on the date it is signed, unless otherwise pro-
vided in the order. Upon petition of a person subject 
to the order and for good cause shown, the Board may 
extend the time for compliance fixed in its order. 
R619-109-300. Notice. 
The Board will notify all parties to the proceeding 
of its decision. A copy of the order with accompanying 
findings of fact and conclusions of law will be deliv-
ered or mailed to each party. 
R619-109-400. Emergency Orders. 
Notwithstanding the other provisions of these reg-
ulations, the Director of the Division or any member 
of the Board is authorized to issue an emergency or-
der without notice or hearing, in accordance with the 
npplicnbj.(^statute. The emergency order will remain 
in effect no longer than until the next regular meet-
ing of the Board, or such shorter period of time as will 
be prescribed by statute. 
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R619-110. Rehearing and Modification 
of Existing Orders. 
R619-110-100. Time for filing. 
R619-110-200. Contents of Petition. 
R619-110-300. Response to Petition. 
R619-110-400. Action on the Petition. 
R619-110-500. Modification of Existing Orders. 
R619-110-100. Time for filing. 
Any person affected by a final order or decision of 
the Board may file a petition for rehearing. Unless 
otherwise provided, a petition for rehearing must be 
filed no later than the 10th day of the month follow-
ing the date of signing of the final order or decision 
for which the rehearing is sought. A copy of such 
petition will be served on each other party to the pro-
ceeding no later than the 15th day of that month. 
R619-110-200. Contents of Petition. 
A petition for rehearing will set forth specifically 
the particulars in which it is claimed the Board's or-
der or decision is unlawful, unreasonable, or unfair. If 
the petition is based upon a claim that the Board 
failed to consider certain evidence, it will include an 
abstract of that evidence. If the petition is based upon 
newly discovered evidence, then the petition will be 
accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the nature 
and extent of such evidence, its relevancy to the is-
sues involved, and a statement that the party could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the 
evidence prior to the hearing. 
R619-110-300. Response to Petition. 
All other parties to the proceeding upon which a 
rehearing is sought may file a response to the petition 
at any time prior to the hearing at which the petition 
will be considered by the Board. Such responses will 
be served on the petitioner at or before the hearing. 
Rule 302 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
presumption continue to exist and the burden 
of establishing the non-existence of the pre-
sumed fact is upon the party against whom the 
presumption operates . . . ." To the same ef-
fect, see Koesling v. Basamakis, 639 P2d 1043 
(Utah 1975). If evidence to rebut a presump-
tion has not been admitted, the presumption 
will determine outcome on the issue; if such 
evidence has been admitted, the presumption 
will dictate the instruction to be given the jury 
on how they are to resolve doubt. There will 
continue to be fact combinations which satisfy 
the burden of going forward with the evidence 
but which are not "presumptions" within the 
meaning of this rule and which therefore do 
not shift the burden of persuasion. They might 
best be called "permissible inferences." 
The Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) did not 
prohibit the application of presumptions in 
criminal cases. Presumptions in criminal cases 
are not treated in this rule. See Utah Code An-
notated, Section 76-1-603 (1953) or any subse-
quent revision of that section. Recent decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court in 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U S. 684 (1975) and 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (19771 
have given a constitutional dimension to pre-
sumptions in criminal cases. 
Subdivision (b) is comparable in substance to 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Utah 
law is believed to generally follow the position 
taken by the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) 
and the provisions of Article 111 as originally 
promulgated by the United States Supreme 
Court. See Presumptions in Utah: A Search for 
Certainty. 6 Utah L. Rev. 196 (1956). 
Cross-References. — Criminal proceed^ 
ings, presumption of fact in, S 76-1-503. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
S3 
W 
3 
ANALYSIS 
Presumption not raised. 
Presumption upheld. 
Presumption not raised. 
Payment of portion of profits to defendant as 
partial reimbursement for expenditures of de-
fendant in connection with business premises 
did not raise presumption of a partnership, and 
plaintiff was required to meet his burden of 
proof without aid of presumption. Koesling v. 
Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975). 
Presumption upheld. 
Where mother executed will and trust in-
strument, and it was later found that the will 
had been executed as a result of undue influ-
ence, there was a prima facie presumption of 
continued undue influence with respect to an 
alleged subsequent ratification of the trust. 
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 
19831. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63. 75. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§§ 159 to 165, 167. 
C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence 5 119. 
A.L.R. — Effect of presumption as evidence 
.ox^ HpoDL-huxdeQ of proof, where controverting 
evidence is introduced,"'!*' A.L.R.3d 19. 
Refusal of defendant in "public figure" libel 
cas«< to identify claimed sources as raising pre-
sumption against existence of source, 19 
A.L.R4th 919. 
Presumptions and evidence respecting iden-
tification of land on which property taxes were 
paid to establish adverse possession, 36 
A.L.R.4th 843. 
Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of 
multiple, nonmedical defendants—modern sta-
tua, 59 A.L.R.4th 201. 
Medical malpractice: presumption or infer, 
ence from failure of hospital or doctor to pro-
duce relevant medical records, 69 A.L.R.4th 
906. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal I*aw *» 305, 
325; Evidence «=» 85 et seq. 
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and 
proceedings. 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact 
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the 
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law. 
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Advisory Committee Note. — The text of criminal cases are not treated in this rule. See 
this rule is taken from Rule 302, Uniform Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953) 
Rules of Evidence (1974). Presumptions in or any subsequent revision of that section. 
ARTICLE IV. 
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determine*-'"" nf'fche action n^ore 
probable or less probable M^p ft wnnlrl fr° m»f|^M1t \u^ ^{[f\pPrei 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is prove or disprove the existence of any "mate-
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable rial fact." Avoiding the use of the term "mate-
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evi- rial fact" accords with the application given to 
dence (1971), but the former rule defined rele- former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court, 
vant evidence as that having a tendency to State v. Peterson, 660 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Cited in State v. Gray, 7J7 P2d 1313 tUtah 
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 
Effect of remoteness. 1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747 
Cited. P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Fisher ex rel. 
„
 A , A Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 
Effect of remoteness.
 1 9 8 8 ) ; HeM<M| y 0 | | | | , 7f>2 R 2 d j 3 1 ? 
Remoteness usually gues to the.weight of the
 ( U l f l h C t A w m . S t n U > y W o r t h e n % 7 6 6 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
 p 2 d 8 ;J9 ( U u h i y 8 8 ) ; S u t e y M u u | W | 7 7 0 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
 p 2 d 9 8 1 ( U u h i m i y s t a t o | n r e R D s 7 7 7 
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, p
 2 d 5 3 2 ( U t a h C t A p p 1 9 8 a , ; Whitehead v. 
McFarland v. Sknggs Companies, Inc., 678 American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920. 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah 
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78. L. Rev. 839. 
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of Compiler's Notes. — The Utah rule also 
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi- adds the words "or the Constitution of the state 
dence (L974) except that prior to the word of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
"fltstute" the words "Constitution of the United dence (1974). 
States" huve been added. 
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Rule 403 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of remoteness. 
Irrelevant evidence. 
Probability evidence. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
_& Discretion of court. 
*1 The trial court is given considerable discre-
tion in deciding whether or not evidence sub-
mitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P.2d 1286 (Utub 197KT 
Effoct of remoteness. 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Irrelevant evidence. 
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another 
participant in the crime had no bearing on de-
fendant's guilt or innocence and was properly 
excluded 8S not relevant to defendant's partici-
pation in the crime State v. Stephens, 667 
P.2d 686 (Utah 1983). 
Probability evidence. 
Courts have routinely excluded probability 
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to 
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical 
conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence 
before it and decide where truth lies. State v. 
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
Scientific evidence. 
The JFVve test (that scientific tests still in the 
experimental stages should not be admitted in 
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced 
from a well recognized scientific principle or 
discovery is admissible if the scientific princi-
ple is sufficiently established) is a valid test, 
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for 
determining when scientific evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted and is not incon-
sistent with Rules 402, 403, and 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Kofford v. Flora, 744 
P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987). 
S tandard of review. 
The judgment of the trial court admitting or 
excluding evidence will not be reversed unless 
it is shown that the discretion exercised 
therein has been abused. Terry v. Zions Coop. 
Mercantile InBt._605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
overruled on other grounds, McFarland v, 
Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1984). 
COLI.ATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. —- United States v. 
Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the 
Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839. 
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA 
Testing' Utah Standards for Admissibility, 
1988 Utah L Rev. 717. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evalu-
ation test results or of statements made during 
test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202. 
AdmTssnSiTiEy and weight of evidence of prior 
mistdentification of accused in connection with 
commission of crime similar to that presently 
charged, 50 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Products liability: admissibility of evidence 
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th 
1186. 
Thermographic tests* admissibility of test re-
sult* in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1105. 
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination 
lineups, 63 A L.R.4th 143. 
Products liability: admissibility of experi-
mental or test evidence to disprove defect in 
motor vehicle, 64 A.L R 4th 125. 
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence 
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary blood-
stains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588. 
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related 
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal 
fluids. 75 A.L.R.4th 897. 
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or 
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th 927. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waate of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 403 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(197U except thnt "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language ja not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept, of 
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402 
(Rule 4031 See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule 403 indicat;*ig that a contin-
uance in most instances would be a more ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise " 
See also Smith v. Esteile. 445 F. Supp. 047 
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process) See the following 
Utah coses to the same effect. Terry v. Zions 
Coop Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
19791; State v. Johns, 615 I\2d 1260 (Utah 
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982). 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and 
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference. 
Crosa-Referencea. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Balancing test. 
Bias. 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Credibility of witness. 
Cumulative evidence. 
Determination of admissibility. 
Expert testimony. 
Film of murder scene. 
Guilty plea. 
Impeachment of witness. 
Inflammatory evidence. 
Other offenses. 
Photographic evidence. 
Prior convictions. 
—Impeachment. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
Tape recordings. 
•—Defendant's admissions. 
—Videotapes in pornography trial. 
Unfairly prejudicial. 
Victim's testimony. 
Cited. 
Balancing test. 
The balancing test of this rule excludes mat-
ter of scant or cumulative probative force, 
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prej-
udicial effect Slate v. Bartlcy, 784 P.2d 1231 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Bias. 
The right to cross-examine regarding bins is 
limited by this rule. State v. Hack ford. 737 
P.2d 20()'(Ulah 1987). 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant, 
may nevertheless be excluded if the usefulness 
of the evidence is more than counterbalanced 
by its disadvantageous effects in confusing the 
issues hefoie the jury, or in creating an undue 
prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative 
weight. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, 
Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Credibility of witness. 
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial 
judge to substitute his as^esament ot the credi-
bility of testimony for that of the jury by ex-
cluding testimony aimply because he does not 
find it credible. Stale v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1987), cert, denied. 485 U.S 1036, 108 S. 
Ct. 1597, 99 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1988). 
Cumulative evidence. 
While there may have been little reason to 
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded 
conversations between the defendant and a 
government informant because the evidence 
was cumulative, their admission was not preju-
dicial because the transcripts merely repeated 
the informant's in-court testimony. State v. 
Knowles, 709 P.2d 311 (Utah 1985). 
Determination of admissibility. 
Although the relevancy of proffered evidence 
is crucial, the probative value of the evidence, 
standing alone, does not determine its admissi-
bility. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 
605 P2d 314 (Utah 19/9), overruled on other 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, 
Inc., 678 P2d 298 (Utah J984). 
At defendant's trial for forging an endorse-
ment on a check, where actual forgery had 
been committed by companion, blank checks 
found in defendant's car were admissible as ev-
idence to support an inference of defendant's 
knowledge of the fraud and intentional partici-
pation in the forgery; the probative value of 
the blank checks was not substantially out-
weighed by their potential prejudicial effect. 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). 
In a drug product liability action, there was 
no error in admitting inserts contained in drug 
packages, containing warnings of possible si^e 
etlects, where the jury verdict finding negli-
gence was general, where the inserts had a 
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